On October 22, 2004, a suspicious letter was left at a UPS drop box outside the OmniCenter building at 250 N. Kansas Street in Wichita, Kansas. Police suspected that the letter was written by BTK and have sent it to the FBI for verification three days after its discovery. Interestingly, the letter was discovered on the 30th anniversary of BTK's first communication with the authorities. Chances are that the timing was no coincidence. The contents of the letter and the identity of the person who alerted police of its whereabouts still remain unclear.
Homicide Detective Kelly Otis of the Wichita Police, who is working on the BTK case, interviewed people who were in the immediate area of the office building and who worked there at the time the letter was allegedly placed at the scene. It was hoped that someone might have witnessed the person who left the letter in the UPS box. One person who was interviewed by Otis claimed to have seen a suspicious individual dropping a letter off at the UPS box on the same day the letter in question was purportedly left at the drop box.
On October 26, 2004, Beth Jett of KAKE-TV news quoted an unidentified man saying, "you could see the nervousness in his eyes...I was right around the corner (from the UPS drop box) and he looked back at me and that's when he took off." The man believed that the suspicious person he saw might have been the BTK killer. BTK is thought to be around 50-60 years old with graying hair and of medium stature.
In the meantime, the authorities continue pouring over clues left by the BTK killer. It is clear that the killer has gone to great effort to misguide and confuse the authorities by providing them with false information likely mixed with subtle truths. It is almost certain that he is highly educated or at least well read, judging by his use of statistical jargon and James Joyce-like style of writing. Moreover, his use of the name Thomas King in one of his letters is very possibly yet another clue to his choice of literature. There is a Canadian author of articles, stories and poems mostly about Native American life who bears the same name.
Both Thomas King and James Joyce are two of many famous authors whose works have been studied by literature students at Kansas State University. Could BTK have studied these authors at some point at the university? There seems to be many links between BTK and the school, especially with the now-deceased lecturer Professor P.J. Wyatt. With the mounting evidence, there is a good chance that BTK was once a student at the university or may have even worked there. However, it may also be another ploy used by the killer to mislead investigators.
If the names BTK used in his letters were in fact clues to his identity, many wonder what would be the significance of the name Bill Thomas Killman. Some believe the name is a puzzle in itself and if arranged properly might spell out a hidden message or meaning. However, the name could also be another sophisticated tool used to taunt police.
Kenneth Thomas and Ralph Kilmann (with one "l" and two "n"s) devised a tool, known as the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument, which is used to help people handle conflict. The instrument is sometimes used by police departments to help officers deal with people who are aggressive or scared, which they often encounter in their line of work. When the killer used the name Bill Thomas Killman in his previous letters, could he have been indirectly referring to this conflict instrument and using it as a tool to mock the police? It is a question that may never be answered. Unfortunately, until the BTK killer is caught we can only speculate about his identity or motivation for his horrific crimes.
On Nov. 30, 2004, Wichita Police did a press release offering a great deal of background information supplied by BTK about his life. This is, indeed unique in the history of serial killers. Occasionally, the concept that serial killers "want to be caught" finds its way into the news. This is pure fiction. Serial killers are pyschopaths. They are entirely self-focused. They will not intentionally put themselves in harm's way. Psychopaths are notorious liars and BTK is no exception.
So, now that BTK has supplied a number of supposedly true facts about himself, what are we to make of it? Are we now to believe this serial killer? Are we now to chase down and investigate his claims?
We would be foolish to do so. If BTK wanted to reveal his identity, he would walk into any police station and do so. But he does not because he is a psychopath who is enjoys taunting and playing with the police and engaging the huge public following that he has amassed. Now that he has "revealed" this biographical sketch, he can be assured that countless BTK amateur sleuths, as well as FBI and Wichita police, will be completely absorbed in it. What could be more gratifying to a dedicated narcissist?
It's possible that some of the information that BTK has volunteered about himself may be true, but you can be assured that nothing factual that he has volunteered will trip him up. He's just too smart for that. Keep in mind that he is very smart, potentially smarter than his pursuers. It's more likely that everything that BTK has volunteered about his biography is false or misleading. He's playing with us, his public. We shall see. The fact that BTK is pushing for attention based on details of his life, rather than recent murders, suggests that he is not in a position to operate freely without the threat of discovery.
Sunday, January 10, 2010
Friday, December 25, 2009
hazzard 4.haz.993 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
During the turn of the nineteenth century and into the early years of the twentieth, spas for the wealthy that purported to "cure" people of contemporary ills were all the rage. Sometimes they offered genuine service but often they were full of quackery, poised simply to siphon off money from trusting clients. Kenneth V. Iserson, in Demon Doctors, and Gregg Olson, in Starvation Heights, offer an account of a female doctor who used her "medicine" for sinister ends.
Dr. Linda Burfield Hazzard
Dr. Linda Burfield Hazzard
Dr. Linda Burfield Hazzard set up her operation in 1907 in Seattle, Washington, and offered several versions of a published manual of her special method. One of the few female doctors in the country (trained as an osteopath), she presented herself as the only licensed fasting therapist in the country, and her final domain was a sanitarium, Wilderness heights, in the small town of Olalla, across the Puget Sound from Seattle. It was an isolated place, with no way to communicate with the outside world. Exuding self-confidence, Dr. Hazzard assured people that her method was a panacea for all manner of ills, because she was able to rid the body of toxins that caused imbalances in the body. As strange as it may seem, she managed to persuade people to go without food, aside from some water and a thin tomato and asparagus soup, for long periods of time. As their bodies shed "toxins," she required enemas (a fashionable purgative in many such places) and provided vigorous massages meant to accelerate the process.
As patients weakened, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire found ways to encourage them to turn over to her their accounts and power of attorney. Not surprisingly, several died under her "care" and she grew richer. Her bigamous husband, Sam, helped get the patients, once they were very weak, to change their wills to make Dr. Hazzard their beneficiary. Yet when attacked for her methods as patients died, she insisted that they had been near death when they came, and she could not be expected to work miracles. Even with these dire stories, she still drew both disciples and patients from around the world. Local residents dubbed the place Starvation Heights, and it caught the attention of authorities when two wealthy British sisters came to "take the cure."
Dr. Linda Burfield Hazzard
Dr. Linda Burfield Hazzard
Dr. Linda Burfield Hazzard set up her operation in 1907 in Seattle, Washington, and offered several versions of a published manual of her special method. One of the few female doctors in the country (trained as an osteopath), she presented herself as the only licensed fasting therapist in the country, and her final domain was a sanitarium, Wilderness heights, in the small town of Olalla, across the Puget Sound from Seattle. It was an isolated place, with no way to communicate with the outside world. Exuding self-confidence, Dr. Hazzard assured people that her method was a panacea for all manner of ills, because she was able to rid the body of toxins that caused imbalances in the body. As strange as it may seem, she managed to persuade people to go without food, aside from some water and a thin tomato and asparagus soup, for long periods of time. As their bodies shed "toxins," she required enemas (a fashionable purgative in many such places) and provided vigorous massages meant to accelerate the process.
As patients weakened, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire found ways to encourage them to turn over to her their accounts and power of attorney. Not surprisingly, several died under her "care" and she grew richer. Her bigamous husband, Sam, helped get the patients, once they were very weak, to change their wills to make Dr. Hazzard their beneficiary. Yet when attacked for her methods as patients died, she insisted that they had been near death when they came, and she could not be expected to work miracles. Even with these dire stories, she still drew both disciples and patients from around the world. Local residents dubbed the place Starvation Heights, and it caught the attention of authorities when two wealthy British sisters came to "take the cure."
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
sweating 4.swe.00200 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
On April 29, 1990, at nearly 2:00 in the morning, a patrol officer discovered the nude body of Carol Dowd, 46, in an alley behind Newman's Sea Food at 4511 Frankford Avenue. Her head and face were battered and she had been viciously stabbed 36 times in the face, neck, chest, and back. In addition, her stomach was cut open, allowing her intestines to spill out through a long wound, and Newton reports that her left nipple was removed. She also had defensive wounds on her hands, as if she had warded off her attacker. The officer who found her had been checking the area due to a prior burglary, and it was estimated that Dowd had been murdered some time after midnight and before 1:40 A.M.
Police sketch of suspect
Police sketch of suspect
She had resided not far from the scene, and a witness told the police she had seen Dowd walking with an older white man only a few hours before. Her clothing was found near her body, and her open purse was in the alley, with its contents spilled partly onto the ground. Because nothing had been taken, robbery was ruled out as a motive (although it would later be reconsidered).
Her brother told reporters that Dowd's life had been uneventful until the late 1960s, when their brother died and she began hearing voices. She was then diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and institutionalized. After being released into a community-based program, she moved into an apartment, where she was raped. Lately, however, she had been living in a community facility where she appeared to be happy.
The police immediately suspected the same killer from the seven previous cases in that area. They hypothesized that he had followed each of his victims after they left area bars at night, or grabbed them before they got to some destination. Asking around, they interviewed the employees of the fish market, and Leonard Christopher, who worked there and also lived nearby, told reporters that the store had been burglarized several times recently. When he had seen the police in the alley that morning, he said, "I just thought they broke in again." Either that, he mused, or they were busting someone for drugs or prostitution; both activities were a frequent occurrence in the alley. When he learned that the police were in fact investigating a murder, he talked with them and admitted that he also had known one of the earlier victims, Margaret Vaughan.
His apparent acquaintance with the area and the victims soon placed him under suspicion. When asked where he was during the evening before, he claimed he was with his girlfriend, but she told detectives that she had spent the night alone at home. That inconsistency triggered more intense questioning, and investigators located a witness who had seen Christopher with Dowd in a bar on the same night that she had been killed. A prostitute who had initially lied finally admitted that she, too, had seen them together outside the bar, while another placed him coming out of the alley by the fish store. She said that he had been sweating and had a large knife in his belt.
A search of his apartment turned up clothing with blood on it. Christopher called a friend at the store to tell them that the police suspected him. That person, who remained anonymous, told the newspaper that their boss had told Christopher to clean up blood in the alley, so of course he had blood on his clothing. Others who worked with him vouched for his good character and humanitarian nature, feeling that it was wrong to pin the murders on him. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Christopher's landlord confirmed these positive impressions, saying only that he sometimes made too much noise.
Although he was a black man and not the middle-aged white man seen with other victims, on May 5, Christopher was arrested and arraigned on charges of robbery, abuse of a corpse, murder, and possession of an instrument of a crime. He was ordered held without bail. Yet even as he sat in jail, another woman in the Frankford Avenue area was about to receive the same treatment as the other victims.
Police sketch of suspect
Police sketch of suspect
She had resided not far from the scene, and a witness told the police she had seen Dowd walking with an older white man only a few hours before. Her clothing was found near her body, and her open purse was in the alley, with its contents spilled partly onto the ground. Because nothing had been taken, robbery was ruled out as a motive (although it would later be reconsidered).
Her brother told reporters that Dowd's life had been uneventful until the late 1960s, when their brother died and she began hearing voices. She was then diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and institutionalized. After being released into a community-based program, she moved into an apartment, where she was raped. Lately, however, she had been living in a community facility where she appeared to be happy.
The police immediately suspected the same killer from the seven previous cases in that area. They hypothesized that he had followed each of his victims after they left area bars at night, or grabbed them before they got to some destination. Asking around, they interviewed the employees of the fish market, and Leonard Christopher, who worked there and also lived nearby, told reporters that the store had been burglarized several times recently. When he had seen the police in the alley that morning, he said, "I just thought they broke in again." Either that, he mused, or they were busting someone for drugs or prostitution; both activities were a frequent occurrence in the alley. When he learned that the police were in fact investigating a murder, he talked with them and admitted that he also had known one of the earlier victims, Margaret Vaughan.
His apparent acquaintance with the area and the victims soon placed him under suspicion. When asked where he was during the evening before, he claimed he was with his girlfriend, but she told detectives that she had spent the night alone at home. That inconsistency triggered more intense questioning, and investigators located a witness who had seen Christopher with Dowd in a bar on the same night that she had been killed. A prostitute who had initially lied finally admitted that she, too, had seen them together outside the bar, while another placed him coming out of the alley by the fish store. She said that he had been sweating and had a large knife in his belt.
A search of his apartment turned up clothing with blood on it. Christopher called a friend at the store to tell them that the police suspected him. That person, who remained anonymous, told the newspaper that their boss had told Christopher to clean up blood in the alley, so of course he had blood on his clothing. Others who worked with him vouched for his good character and humanitarian nature, feeling that it was wrong to pin the murders on him. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Christopher's landlord confirmed these positive impressions, saying only that he sometimes made too much noise.
Although he was a black man and not the middle-aged white man seen with other victims, on May 5, Christopher was arrested and arraigned on charges of robbery, abuse of a corpse, murder, and possession of an instrument of a crime. He was ordered held without bail. Yet even as he sat in jail, another woman in the Frankford Avenue area was about to receive the same treatment as the other victims.
Thursday, July 30, 2009
Mr. Hubertus van Mook 4.hvm.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
274. Japanese Negotiators Recommend Acceptance of Dutch Proposals. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
At the same time that the Netherlands' reply to the Japanese proposals was sent to Tokyo, the Japanese Consul in Batavia, on June 7, 1941, suggested the acceptance of the Dutch proposals since they were the best that Japan could hope to get, though the Dutch had not agreed to Japanese demands concerning oil, rubber, and bauxite. [1056]
At a conference between Mr. Hubertus van Mook, Director of Economic Affairs in the Netherlands East Indies, and Tokyo's representatives on June 10, 1941, the Japanese Minister discovered that the intentions of the Dutch officials were considerably more liberal and elastic than the document of the Netherlands' reply had indicated. [1057] However, on June 12, 1941, Tokyo informed its diplomats throughout the world that the Dutch had definitely rejected Japan's proposals, and had refused to export all the raw materials desired by the Japanese. Furthermore, they threatened to cut off all exports, if Japan reshipped them to Germany. [1058] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
[1053] II, Ibid.
[1054] II, Ibid.
[1055] II, 1051.
[1056] II, 1052, 1053.
[1057] II, 1054.
[1055] II, 1055.
191
275. Japanese Security Precautions for Diplomatic Codes.
Japan began early in June 1941 to safeguard its state secrets in regard to the Netherlands Indies by adopting new security precautions. When the Japanese Consul in Soerabaya returned a safe to Japan, it was examined by Dutch officials; and as a result, the Japanese Consul in Batavia asserted on June 7, 1941 that there was little prospect of sending secret documents to Japan without inspection by the Netherlands' government. [1059]
To ensure safe communications with the home office, the Japanese Minister in Batavia suggested that reports be exchanged verbally as much as possible, rather than by telegrams. To avoid difficulties with Dutch officials, he was particularly insistent that official couriers coming into the Netherlands Indies be members of the Foreign Office. [1060] To expedite the special handling of messages for military attachés, on June 28, 1941, Tokyo ordered that a caption word including A or M as its second and fifth letters be used as a designator. [1061]
On July 10, 1941, Foreign Minister Matsuoka notified Batavia that a courier, Mr. Zoku Nomoto, who was carrying with him secret documents and cipher machines for both Batavia and Singapore, would have to be passed through the customs. Mr. Ishizawa had already informed Tokyo that baggage could be passed through without examination, provided official seals were attached. [1062]
On August 4, 1941, Tokyo sent out a circular covering the destruction of obsolete codes and the care of the current ones. [1063] During this month, the existing code was also to be replaced by a new and more secret system. [1064]
276. Japan Discriminates Against Dutch Firms.
Meanwhile, in Tokyo, agreements with Dutch business interests were reached as of June 5, 1941, and negotiations were begun with the leaders of the Japan‑South Seas General Merchandise Export Guild. In order to insure the Guild's participation and concurrence in Japanese trade negotiations, it was stipulated that its branches in Japan should not be assessed by the Finance Ministry, as were the Dutch firms. The Japanese anticipated that this would dissatisfy Dutch business establishments in Japan, though other Japanese export guilds would probably join the agreement because of the new conditions. [1065]
On previous occasions Japanese guilds had refused to admit Dutch firms, but in late June 1941, as a result of Tokyo's intercession, the Dutch received better treatment from the guilds. [1066]
277. Japanese Business Methods in the East Indies.
Tokyo was informed on June 9, 1941 that branches of the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Nomura, Iwai, and Kasho companies in Batavia had made competitive offers for June loadings of rubber, and immediate counteraction was suggested. [1067]
[1059] II, 1056.
[1060] II, 1057.
[1061] II, 1058.
[1062] II, 1059.
[1063] II, 1060.
[1064] II, 1061.
[1065] II, 1062.
[1066] II, 1063.
[1067] II, 1064.
192
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Three members of a large Japanese banking and investment corporation had gone to the Netherlands East Indies to establish a joint stock company dealing with rubber plantations in Borneo and Soerabaya. Directing the Japanese Minister to obtain another month's stay in the East Indies for these gentlemen, Tokyo, on June 12, 1941, expressed the hope that they would accomplish their objective. By such close supervision of Japanese business interests was Japan striving to control the East Indies' rubber market. [1068]
278. Japan Foresees the Discontinuance of Negotiations.
Tokyo stated on June 14, 1941 that it was becoming impossible for the two countries to successfully carry on further negotiations, since the reply of the Dutch East Indies' authorities reserved the right to alter at will the export volume of those materials which the Japanese regarded as indispensable. Japan asserted that no international agreement could be made on the basis of such an attitude.
Although the Dutch claimed that the object of its foreign policy was based on furthering the progress and prosperity of its own peoples, Japan felt that the Netherlands East Indies could accomplish much more by firmly establishing commercial cooperation with Japan, and in this way contributing to the peace of the Far East. Claiming to be the economical benefactor of the Dutch East Indies, Japan insisted that merely out of consideration for the unity of purpose existing between the two countries, it had contributed generously to the development of these islands. [1069]
279. Japan Plans to Publicize the Discontinuance of Its Negotiations.
Batavian authorities revealed to the Japanese Minister on June 14, 1941 that Tokyo was planning to publish the results of the negotiations between the two countries without first informing the various Dutch authorities that a diplomatic rupture was inevitable. The Japanese Minister at Batavia warned his Foreign Office that the result of such unilateral action would be detrimental to future agreements. [1070] Tokyo replied on June 14, 1941 that since the negotiations had failed, publicity in regard to the matter was solely a responsibility of Tokyo and was no concern of the Dutch.
The Japanese also pointed out that during the meetings of November 1940, when a compromise had been reached regarding the purchase of petroleum, joint communiqués issued by Dutch petroleum interests had advised the public of the quantities involved. Furthermore, Tokyo stated that the Netherlands Indies, according to authoritative intelligence, had kept the United States and Great Britain constantly informed regarding every detail during the discussions.
In addition the Japanese were indignant because the Netherlands East Indies had sent to its ministry in Tokyo both the Japanese proposal of May 14, 1941, and the Netherlands' reply of June 6, 1941 in plain text. [1071] This was very irritating to the Japanese because their code clerks in Batavia had spent ten hours in enciphering the message which the Dutch had already transmitted in plain text. [1072] In view of the dangers to their cryptographic systems from this procedure, Tokyo thereafter permitted its representatives to send foreign text messages in a simpler code system or even in plain text. [1073]
[1068] II, 1065.
[1069] II, 1035.
[1070] II, 1066.
[1071] II, 1067.
[1072] II, 1068.
[1073] II, 1069.
193
280. Japanese Minister in Batavia Protests Against Tokyo's Procedure.
Japanese Minister Daihyo in Batavia warned Tokyo on June 16, 1941 that if the Japanese were to publish the results of the conferences with the Dutch government, extreme care must be taken in wording the report lest a bad impression be created, particularly since they were breaking off negotiations with the Dutch. The Foreign Office in Tokyo should not give the impression that Japanese public opinion, contrary to the policies of the Japanese government, was in any way controlling its actions, since this would impair the dignity of Japan.
Because there were at least 7,000 Japanese living in the Netherlands East Indies, Minister Daihyo desired to continue normal relations, at least with the Dutch government. At the same time, however, he pointed out that to declare openly that Consul General Ishizawa was to continue the negotiations after the negotiations had failed would be a black mark against Japanese prestige. Therefore, until more natural circumstances permitted, Minister Daihyo suggested that no revelation of the Japanese desire for further talks with the Dutch be made. While the needs of Japan demanded that the petroleum question be settled immediately, it could not be considered separately, since it was but one part of the trade negotiations. [1074]
281. Tokyo Accedes to Minister Daihyo's Request.
Tokyo replied promptly to Minister Daihyo's protest on June 16, 1941, and requested him to assure the Dutch East Indies that any further negotiations would not be an attempt to save the Japanese Cabinet from embarrassment. By discontinuing the talks and recalling its representatives, Tokyo was endeavoring to prevent the rise of circumstances which might infuriate the Japanese people and turn them against the Dutch East Indies. In addition, the Japanese government wished to avoid giving the world the impression that normal relations with the Dutch East Indies had been disrupted, and that the two countries were not at swords' points. Therefore, Japanese Consul General Ishizawa was to indicate in any public announcements that discussions would be continued from time to time with the Dutch. [1075]
282. The Netherlands East Indies and Japan Issue a Joint Communiqué (June 17, 1941).
On June 17, 1941, after a conference between Mr. Yoshizawa, Mr. Ishizawa, Mr. van Mook and Mr. Hoogstraten which did not change the answer of the Netherlands in any way, a joint communiqué was issued as follows:
Both the Netherland and the Japanese delegations greatly regret that the economic negotiations, which has been conducted between them, has unfortunately come to no satisfactory result. It is needless, however, to add that the discontinuation of the present negotiation will lead to no change in the normal relations between the Netherlands Indies and Japan. [1076]
Although no agreement had been drawn up between the two governments as a result of their extended conferences, Foreign Minister Matsuoka expressed the opinion on June 18, 1941 that the Japanese would be able to obtain through ordinary business deals the types of goods that the Dutch considered unimportant. However, as a political gesture to warn the Dutch that Japan needed vital raw materials, the Japanese representative, Mr. Yoshizawa, urged the Governor General of the Indies to reconsider his stand. Nothing came of this, and the Japanese negotiators were ordered to withdraw. [1077]
[1074] II, 1070.
[1075] II, 1071.
[1076]Hubertus J. van Mook—op. cit., p. 122.
[1077] II, 1072.
194
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
283. Japan's Urgent Need for Petroleum and Tin.
In view of the Japanese need for petroleum, on June 18, 1941 the Chief of the Japanese Fuel Bureau requested his petroleum representative, Mr. Ito, to remain in Batavia even after other delegates had returned home. Since the international situation was extremely delicate, he directed Mr. Ito to obtain fulfillment of oil contracts which had already been made by the Dutch.
Mr. Matsuoka promised that Japan would not make any direct demands for future oil purchases or for the development of oil fields in the East Indies. [1078] But on June 21, 1941, the Japanese Consul General was instructed by Tokyo to protest immediately to the Dutch authorities against the concentration of Dutch oil products and transportation in British hands. [1079]
To take advantage of any possible diplomatic change after the breakdown of negotiations in June 1941, the Japanese desired to keep their commercial representatives in Batavia so as to be able to renew negotiations for oil rights with the Dutch. Problems other than oil rights, according to the Chief of the Japanese Fuel Bureau, were to be given secondary considerations for the time being. [1080]
A difference of opinion arose on June 19, 1941 between two Japanese representatives in Batavia. Mr. Hatanaka felt that because the negotiations had been discontinued, the acquisition of raw materials could be handled by the local branch of Mitsui, and Mr. Ito could return to Tokyo, leaving Mr. Hatanaka to carry on alone. On the other hand, Mr. Ito believed that the Dutch were just about to accept the Japanese separate proposal and wished, therefore, to remain until the affair could be finished. [1081] But on June 22, 1941, Mr. Ito reported that he was returning to Tokyo since he could do nothing more concerning the petroleum question. [1082]
By virtue of the rupture of the negotiations, Mr. van Mook, the Director of Economic Affairs in the East Indies, had explained that the negotiators had no authority to enter discussions pertaining to other matters of trade. Thus, questions regarding the shipment of fuel would come as usual under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines and would be discussed by competent industrialists. However, Mr. van Mook pointed out that at present the Bureau had been divested of the authority to deal with such matters because of the political aspects involved. Regardless of whatever point of view the Japanese might take concerning future acquisition of rights and interests, Mr. van Mook insisted that present agreements were impossible. [1083]
The withdrawal of Saito, a Japanese fuel negotiator, a few weeks later attested to the belief of Japanese authorities that the decision was irrevocable. [1084] Nevertheless, some time later on July 30, 1941, the Chief of the Netherlands East Indies Trade Bureau assured the Japanese Minister that his government had no intention of abrogating the existing oil agreement; nor did he believe that the Dutch oil company would refuse to sell the product. Regarding this latter point, the Japanese official stated that the company was delaying the loading of oil for which payment had already been made. Assuring the Japanese Minister that the company was undoubtedly discussing the provisions which called for payment in dollars, the Dutch official stated that Mr. van Mook and representatives of the oil company were to confer on the following day. Although company officials would be heard before any decision were made, it was hoped that an agreement, satisfactory to all parties, would be concluded. [1085]
[1078] II, 1073.
[1079] II, 1074.
[1080] II, 1075.
[1081] II, 1076, 1077.
[1082] II, 1078.
[1083] II, 1079.
[1084] II, 1080.
[1085] II, 1081.
195
As a result of Mr. Ito's report, [1086] loan the Chief of the Fuel Section, expressing his appreciation for their difficult experiences, directed both Mr. Ito and Mr. Hatanaka to return home. [1087] A report from Minister Daihyo, which stressed the futility of keeping Japanese oil negotiators in Batavia in the face of the Dutch refusal to deal with them, probably had much to do with their return. [1088]
The Japanese were concerned about other vital materials as well as oil. Though the Mitsubishi Company had previously obtained a year's contract to export 3,000 tons of tin from the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch had reduced that amount to a mere 2,300 tons. However, even after the negotiations had been broken off, the Japanese were hopeful that the Dutch might change their uncompromising attitude concerning tin and manganese. [1089]
284. The Netherlands Indies Reduces Shipping to Japan.
Mr. Ishizawa reported on June 21, 1941 that the Dutch were cutting down on all shipping to Japan in an attempt to apply a wartime embargo act. Instructions had been issued by the Finance Minister to limit material sent to Japan to 20,000 tons per month. According to the Japanese, this reduction of shipping was connected with Netherlands national defense and had been ordered by Dutch shipping authorities in New York, and therefore, it was hard to discover the reasons for it. [1090] In order to conceal Japanese purchases in the East Indies, on June 21, 1941 Mr. Ishizawa suggested that all telegrams regarding such matters be sent secretly to him in Batavia. [1091]
285. Japan Suspects American Support of Netherlands Indies.
Because Holland was one of the nations joined against the Axis, and because its own fundamental policies were closely akin to those of England and the United States, the Netherlands East Indies was greatly affected by the position of the United States in regard to the Japanese "New Order" in Asia. As early as June 22, 1941, according to the Japanese Ambassador in Rome, an intelligence report, sent to the Vatican by the Apostolic Delegate to Batavia, had indicated that the United States, at first, had brought pressure to bear upon the Netherlands East Indies in a scheme to obtain an excellent bargaining position, so as to force Japan into neutrality, if the United States went to war.
Later, however, the United States, with Great Britain, had made the Netherlands East Indies part of a defensive line that included the Philippines, China and Thailand, and thus, by cooperative encirclement, had attempted to force Japan to accept its material aid. Because of this action, according to Ambassador Horikiri's version of the report, the Netherlanders became still more certain that Japan would attack their territory. [1092]
Military cooperation between America, Great Britain, and the Netherlands government was announced by a Japanese report of July 17, 1941, which also indicated that an American air base was being built in Papua, New Guinea! [1093] The Japanese Minister to Batavia reported a
[1086] II, 1078.
[1087] II, 1082.
[1088] II, 1083.
[1089] II, 1084.
[1090] II, 1085.
[1091] II, 1086.
[1092] II, 1087.
[1093] II, 1088.
196
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
week later, on July 26, 1941, that if the United States should carry out a general embargo, the Dutch people were convinced that Japan would extend its southward march to include Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. On the other hand, although there was to be a blackout for three days of an area centering on Batavia and Baitenzorugu in preparation for any future air raid, the people of Batavia, as a whole, showed little concern over a possible breach of diplomatic relations with Japan. [1094]
286. Reaction of Netherlands Indies to German‑Russian War.
After war began between Germany and Soviet Russia, the Japanese Consul in Batavia stated in an interview with Mr. Hoogstraten on June 23, 1941 that now the Dutch could cease being anxious over the re‑exportation to Germany of material purchased in the Indies, and that they could ship supplies to Japan in an unlimited amount. Still uncertain of the Japanese position, however, the Dutch were not willing to make agreements on the hypothesis that Japan would not aid its German partner. On the other hand the Japanese feared that the Netherlanders would lend their full support to Russia, because they were fighting Germany.
According to the Japanese Minister in Batavia, the Dutch believed that the conflict between Germany and Russia would serve to dissipate Nazi strength, while the fighting power of the British, aided by the United States, would increase. In answer to the Japanese Consul's statement that Europe would then come under the control of Commissar Stalin instead of Hitler, Mr. Hoogstraten asserted that Russia had no great ambition in western Europe. Furthermore, with the destruction of Hitlerism and the cooperation of Great Britain, his mother country, Holland, could be restored. [1095]
When the Japanese Consul was questioned by Mr. Hoogstraten regarding Japan's attitude toward the Russo‑German conflict, he replied that the Tripartite Pact with Germany stipulated that the relations between the respective treaty powers and Soviet Russia were in no way to be affected by the alliance; therefore, the present hostilities would have no immediate effect upon Japan. In spite of the reassurance which the Japanese gave Dutch officials regarding their neutrality in the European war, the Japanese Minister still feared that the Netherlands East Indies would become more anti‑Japanese and that exports to Japan would be reduced to permit large‑scale shipments to Soviet Russia. He suggested that Japan formulate and maintain a definite policy with regard to this situation. [1096]
Since there was always the possibility of Japan's attacking Russia, Mr. Ishizawa made inquiries to sound out the effect of such a move upon the Netherlands East Indies. In his report to Tokyo on July 15, 1941 he announced that if Japan did not commit any direct hostile acts against the Netherlands Indies, there was little chance of war between the two countries, although further regulation of exports to Japan would be inevitable if a Japanese‑Russian war broke out. Mr. Ishizawa pointed to the friendly attitude of the Netherlanders toward Italian residents, in spite of Italy's alliance with Germany, as proof that the Japanese would be treated in the same way. [1097]
[1094] II, 1089.
[1096] II, 1090.
[1096] II, Ibid.
[1087] II, 1091.
197
287. After Effects of Discontinuance of Japanese‑Dutch Negotiations.
Ten days after the publication of the joint communiqué which announced the discontinuance of the Japanese‑Dutch economic negotiations, the Japanese Minister in Batavia, on June 26, 1941 reported to Tokyo that the atmosphere had become more favorable to Japan and that Japanese residents in the East Indies were not much perturbed. [1098] However, the Japanese-Dutch Society was to be closed in late July 1941, [1099] and about July 15, 1941 the Mitsubishi Company ordered its officials in Batavia to evacuate their families. [1100]
As a result of this prospective exodus, the Japanese Minister inquired whether the order of the Mitsubishi Company stemmed from the Japanese Foreign Office or was issued independently. In addition, the Mitsubishi representative informed his home office that general conditions were calm in the East Indies, and for this reason Japanese families did not desire to return to Japan. He also pointed out that the sending of evacuation orders in plain language, as had been done in this instance, would disturb the Dutch government, would not make it change its decision, and would only damage Japanese interests by lessening production. [1101]
288. Netherlands Indies Resent Japanese Intelligence Activities.
When the second Japanese economic mission had come to the Netherlands East Indies, Colonels Maeda and Oga, and Lt. Col. Ishii of the Japanese army had accompanied it. The Netherlands army had been very disturbed by their arrival, but the Dutch refrained from refusing them admittance to avoid affronting Japan. However, after Minister Yoshizawa departed with his associates, on June 27, 1941 Mr. Hoogstraten pointed out that the officers had been more engrossed in inspecting all parts of the Netherlands Indies than in taking part in the negotiations, and he requested Mr. Ishizawa to arrange for their departure on a ship leaving for Japan on July 3, 1941. [1102]
Tokyo inquired, on July 3, 1941, whether the refusal of the Netherlands Indies to permit a certain Japanese naval officer to return was based on the undesirability of the officer or on a general policy of not accepting Japanese language officers. [1103] The refusal of the Dutch to permit the return of a Japanese Vice Consul was because of his previous activities among the radical elements of the native population. [1104]
Whether the visit of the Japanese army officers had been valuable in securing vital information regarding military strength in the East Indies cannot be definitely ascertained, but it was known that the activities of Japanese spies in that area were attaining some measure of success. According to one spy report on July 18, 1941, details of airfields south of Batavia, west of Serang and on the western tip of Java were known. [1105]
Cooperation between the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, England and the United States was noted in a Japanese message from Batavia on July 18, 1941. United States naval officers stationed in a certain section of Soerabaya and Java, as well as British and Australian army officers in Bandon and Batavia, were conducting military training at this time. It was suspected that at other points on the island, allied officers acted as instructors or liaison officers. [1106]
[1098] II, 1092.
[1099] II, 1093.
[1100] II, 1094.
[1101] II, 1095.
[1102] II, 1096.
[1103] II, 1097.
[1104] II, 1098.
[1105] II, 1099.
[1106] II, 1100.
198
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
In order to direct the military efforts of the Dutch Indies, Sir Robert Brooke‑Popham, the British Commander in Chief of the Far East forces, and a United States Naval aviation officer, Normer, as well as one officer each from the Australian army and navy, arrived in that vicinity some time before July 23, 1941. [1107]
289. The Netherlands East Indies Reduces Exports to Japan.
Though business conditions appeared to be normal, [1108] cancellation or postponement of exports which had already been agreed to by the Dutch drew protests from Tokyo. Listing palm oil, kapok, tannin, scrap iron, rubber and kopra among the products affected by the reduction of exports to Japan, Japanese representatives in Batavia insisted in mid‑July 1941 that the Dutch had failed to carry out their contracts since in the case of all vital products, almost half the quantity ordered had been stopped. [1109]
The Dutch authorities promised to reconsider their decision in view of these previous commitments. [1110] Hoping to receive as much as possible, Tokyo directed on July 18, 1941 that all articles already contracted for were to be exported immediately, aboard the Nichiran Maru and the Chirubuto Maru which had been assigned to the Netherlands East Indies. [1111]
290. Dutch Reprisals Against Japanese Communications.
Around July 26, 1941 Tokyo was informed that the Netherlands East Indies threatened to carry out reprisals if Tokyo decreed that only English or Japanese could be spoken in telephone conversations to the East Indies. The Netherlands government in turn would forbid the use of the Japanese language over its international telephone wires. The Dutch put the order prohibiting the use of the Japanese language into effect on July 29, 1941, and Tokyo hastened to negotiate with Batavia immediately in an attempt to have it retracted. [1112]
291. Japan Allays Dutch Fears Concerning a Japanese‑British War.
According to a statement made on July 26, 1941 by Mr. Utuheren of the Dutch Immigration Office, the occupation of southern French Indo-China by Japan had damaged Japanese relations with England and the United States, and if war broke out between the Japanese and the English, there was little doubt that the Netherlands East Indies would fight on the side of England. The Japanese Minister replied that the United States and England had been increasing their assistance to China, and that the Chinese, in turn, were hindering Japan from procuring necessary French Indo‑Chinese goods. Though asserting that if Japan had not acted immediately, British economic and military influence would have dominated French Indo-China, the Japanese Minister expressed the opinion that the possibility of war between Japan and
England was remote. Certain Netherlands Indies' officials were also convinced that Great Britain and Japan would not war over the French Indo-China issue, but they considered the concentration of Japanese
[1107] II, 1101.
[1108] II, 1102.
[1109] II, 1103.
[1110] II, 1104.
[1111] II, 1105.
[1112] II, 1106, 1107.
199
forces in the southern part of French Indo-China to be a potential threat toward the Netherlands Indies. A meeting of important officials at the Governor's mansion made it apparent that the Netherlands Indies was giving deep consideration to its official attitude regarding the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China. [1113]
292. Japan Releases a Confiscated Cargo.
In an attempt to checkmate any movement of war materials to the Chungking government, in the early part of July 1941 the Japanese in Shanghai had held up and investigated a ship with a cargo of machinery purchased by the Dutch. This occasioned a protest from the Netherlands East Indies and Great Britain. Stressing the importance of the matter, Mr. Hoogstraten, the Dutch Commerce Bureau Chief, had then requested that the machinery be handed over immediately to the Netherlanders. [1114]
According to the Japanese, the exportation had been illegal, since no permit had been obtained from the proper military authorities, [1115] and in addition, the vessel had acted contrary to the orders of the Japanese water police. Furthermore, a bank connected with this transaction was in alliance with the Chungking regime. However, since Japan had no wish to incur the hostility of such an important trading country as the Netherlands East Indies, and because Japanese enterprises in the area were too valuable to be endangered by retaliation for one shipment of goods, Tokyo decided against confiscating this machinery. [1116]
On July 25, 1941 the Netherlands Indies' director, Mr. van Mook was informed that the machinery had been released and he expressed his appreciation to Japanese authorities. [1117] A promise of increased trade had previously been made by the Netherlands Indies' authorities who agreed not to transfer the machinery in question to Chungking. [1118]
293. The Netherlands Indies Freezes Japanese Funds.
The Netherlands Indies learned on July 26, 1941 that the United States and Great Britain had suspended monetary and economic intercourse with Japan. After much hurried activity, the Netherlands Indies was able to issue measures, on July 28, 1941, which suspended the monetary agreement and all monetary transactions with Japan, applied the Export Licensing Law to all exports to the Japanese Empire, Manchuria, occupied China, and Indo-China, and subjected all banks to a system of permits affecting monetary or credit transactions with Japanese subjects. [1119]
294. Economic Cooperation of the Netherlands Indies With England and the United States.
The Japanese Minister in Batavia reported to Tokyo on July 28, 1941 that despite some laxness in enforcing economic sanctions, the Netherlands East Indies was cooperating with England and the United States in economic warfare against Japan. Furthermore, Mr. van Mook
[1113] II, 1108.
[1114] II, 1109.
[1115] II, 1110.
[1116] II, 1111.
[1117] II, 1112.
[1118] II, 1110.
[1119] Hubertus J. van Mock‑op. cit., pp. 126‑127.
200
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
asserted that if the Japanese continued their aggression, the Indies might conclude a military alliance with the United States and England. Nevertheless, the Japanese Minister believed that the Netherlands Indies was anxious to avert an attack by Japan. [1120]
Since the betterment of Japanese‑Dutch relations was a matter of extreme urgency, Mr. Hoogstraten and Mr. Ishizawa met on July 30, 1941 to seek a solution of the problem. To explain Japan's southward sweep into French Indo-China, Mr. Ishizawa stated that its purpose was to cooperate with the government of France in facilitating the defense of that territory. However, Mr. Hoogstraten assumed that Japan's antagonism toward his country was increasing because Japan had established military bases there.
In spite of Japanese protests that no ulterior motives were involved, the Netherlands East Indies viewed Japanese army, naval, and air bases in the southern part of French Indo-China as a threat to her territorial integrity. At this point Mr. Ishizawa reminded Mr. Hoogstraten that the Dutch had boasted of the firm establishment of an American‑British‑Chinese‑Dutch joint front, and in view of the strong defense which the Dutch had attained by these alliances, Japan could not understand their fear of Axis strength.
In spite of the Japanese Minister's remarks, Mr. Hoogstraten insisted that curtailments of military supplies to Japan were necessary for the defense of the Netherlands Indies. Mr. Ishizawa then advised Mr. Hoogstraten that Japan would find other means of obtaining these essential materials. [1121]
After his conversation with Mr. Hoogstraten on July 30, 1941, the Japanese Minister in Batavia declared emphatically that as long as Japanese forces remained in French Indo-China, the Netherlands Indies would treat Japan as an enemy. In order to combat the punitive trade embargoes imposed by the Dutch, he suggested certain Japanese counter‑measures. Although the freezing order regarding Japan's assets had thus far been strictly enforced, the Japanese Minister felt that since the Netherlanders were also being greatly inconvenienced by it, negotiations between Mr. Imagawa of the Specie Bank, and officials of the Administrative Bureau and the Java Bank might produce a favorable solution. In the meantime, however, trade between the two countries was becoming more restricted, and Mr. Ishizawa felt that decisive measures should be initiated against the Netherlands East Indies. [1122]
295. Japan Retaliates by Freezing Netherlands Assets.
In retaliation for the economic measures which the Dutch had taken against the Japanese, Tokyo froze Netherlands assets throughout the Japanese Empire. On July 30, 1941, Mr. Hoogstraten and the Japanese Minister at Batavia discussed various points connected with the freezing orders of both countries. The Dutch official claimed that the Japanese should permit the exportation of not only goods which had been paid for, but also goods under contract, since their title had been transferred to the Netherlands East Indies. If, as a result of the freezing order, the Dutch merchants lost the entire stock of goods purchased from Japan, Mr. Hoogstraten warned that the Netherlands East Indies would use the frozen Japanese funds as collateral for the twelve million guilders involved. [1123]
Replying that Japan did not intend to prevent shipment of goods which had been already purchased, the Japanese Minister stated that his country was at present experimenting with the first export embargo it had ever imposed. Furthermore, he insisted that the Netherlands' government had no justification for taking any retaliatory measures against Japan.
[1120] II, 1113.
[1121] II, 1114.
[1122] II, 1115.
[1123] II, 1116.
201
Mr. Hoogstraten assured Mr. Ishizawa that if Dutch merchants were permitted to ship their goods from Japan, not only would certain Japanese funds be released, but sugar and similar products would also be shipped from the Netherlands Indies to Japan. However, because the Japanese occupation of the southern part of French Indo-China constituted a direct threat to the Indies, a comparatively strict limitation would still be observed on the exportation of petroleum and other war materials in which the Japanese Minister was particularly interested. Regarding the abrogation of the petroleum agreement, Mr. Hoogstraten stated that his government had no intention of permitting the oil companies to export the undelivered portion of the oil under contract. [1124]
Since the Japanese Minister in Batavia felt that the Netherlands East Indies would still continue to tighten restrictions on exported commodities to Japan, he again suggested on August 1, 1941 that strict counter‑measures be taken. Knowing that an embargo against food supplies, such as salt‑fish from French Indo-China, would give rise to a serious problem for the Netherlands Indies, the Japanese planned to prevent this and other essential items from reaching the East Indies. [1125]
Further discussion by the Japanese Minister with Mr. Hoogstraten finally won some concessions, according to a report to Tokyo on August 2, 1941, for the Netherlands Indies granted permission for one shipment of rubber, tin, and ilmonite. [1126] Nevertheless, during the first few days of August 1941, growing anxiety was evident among Japanese residents. Because of the constant stream of applicants for passage aboard ships bound for Japan, the South Seas Shipping Company considered dispensing with cargoes until Japanese nationals could be evacuated. [1127]
296. Japanese Nationals Are Evacuated From The Netherlands Indies.
On previous occasions, at the direction of the Japanese Minister, the leaders of Japanese associations had advised Japanese residents owning firmly established enterprises to remain in the Netherlands Indies and continue their business. On July 31, 1941, however, he planned to advise many of them to return home since in the event that improvement in Japanese-Dutch relations became impossible, a disorderly evacuation would disgrace Japan. Judging from recent trends, and because of the danger of arrest for Japanese residents, it was also felt that all Japanese subjects acquainted with the situation in the Netherlands Indies and able to speak the Malayan language would be of great value to the military authorities, and should, therefore, return to Japan and register immediately. [1128]
297. East Indian Merchants Purchase Japanese Stocks.
Upon hearing rumors that the government of the Netherlands Indies would freeze Japanese funds, Chinese and Arabian merchants in the East Indies realized that Japanese merchants would encounter difficulties in future importations and would be interested, therefore, in cash
[1124] II, Ibid.
[1125] II, 1117.
[1126] II, 1118.
[1127] II, 1119.
[1128] II, 1115.
202
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
transactions. These traders attempted to buy up all the articles which Japanese firms had on hand, and in this way obtained a monopoly on many materials. The Netherlands Indies' government, fearing the increased prices that would result from such reckless buying, prohibited the transfer of woven and knitted goods, fabricated materials and other articles. Although these restrictions were designated to curb the transactions of the Chinese and other merchants, the Japanese Minister felt that inflation was now an imminent danger in the East Indies, and would cause more trouble to the Dutch themselves than to Japan. [1129]
298. Japan is Urged to Further Retaliation Against the Dutch.
On August 3, 1941 the Japanese Minister in Batavia reported to Tokyo that the Netherlands East Indies was concerned about food for the Dutch residents in Japan, and about the shipment of goods out of Japan which had been contracted and paid for by Netherlands Indies' merchants. Although Tokyo had so far been indecisive concerning these questions, Dutch firms nevertheless placed considerable reliance on the influence of Mr. Ishizawa.
Believing that Japan's delay was responsible for the issuance of the Netherlands freezing order, Mr. Ishizawa suggested again that Japan retaliate immediately when any actions contrary to her national well‑being were undertaken by the Netherlands Indies. He requested, therefore, on August 3, 1941 that decisions reached by the Foreign Office concerning such action be wired to him without any delay. [1130] Furthermore, if time were wasted while he waited for specific instructions, a general embargo might be imposed by the Dutch with the result that Japan would be prevented from obtaining even those materials which were procurable. Such action on the part of the Dutch would possibly freeze Japanese assets indefinitely. [1131]
At the same time that the Netherlands' reply to the Japanese proposals was sent to Tokyo, the Japanese Consul in Batavia, on June 7, 1941, suggested the acceptance of the Dutch proposals since they were the best that Japan could hope to get, though the Dutch had not agreed to Japanese demands concerning oil, rubber, and bauxite. [1056]
At a conference between Mr. Hubertus van Mook, Director of Economic Affairs in the Netherlands East Indies, and Tokyo's representatives on June 10, 1941, the Japanese Minister discovered that the intentions of the Dutch officials were considerably more liberal and elastic than the document of the Netherlands' reply had indicated. [1057] However, on June 12, 1941, Tokyo informed its diplomats throughout the world that the Dutch had definitely rejected Japan's proposals, and had refused to export all the raw materials desired by the Japanese. Furthermore, they threatened to cut off all exports, if Japan reshipped them to Germany. [1058] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
[1053] II, Ibid.
[1054] II, Ibid.
[1055] II, 1051.
[1056] II, 1052, 1053.
[1057] II, 1054.
[1055] II, 1055.
191
275. Japanese Security Precautions for Diplomatic Codes.
Japan began early in June 1941 to safeguard its state secrets in regard to the Netherlands Indies by adopting new security precautions. When the Japanese Consul in Soerabaya returned a safe to Japan, it was examined by Dutch officials; and as a result, the Japanese Consul in Batavia asserted on June 7, 1941 that there was little prospect of sending secret documents to Japan without inspection by the Netherlands' government. [1059]
To ensure safe communications with the home office, the Japanese Minister in Batavia suggested that reports be exchanged verbally as much as possible, rather than by telegrams. To avoid difficulties with Dutch officials, he was particularly insistent that official couriers coming into the Netherlands Indies be members of the Foreign Office. [1060] To expedite the special handling of messages for military attachés, on June 28, 1941, Tokyo ordered that a caption word including A or M as its second and fifth letters be used as a designator. [1061]
On July 10, 1941, Foreign Minister Matsuoka notified Batavia that a courier, Mr. Zoku Nomoto, who was carrying with him secret documents and cipher machines for both Batavia and Singapore, would have to be passed through the customs. Mr. Ishizawa had already informed Tokyo that baggage could be passed through without examination, provided official seals were attached. [1062]
On August 4, 1941, Tokyo sent out a circular covering the destruction of obsolete codes and the care of the current ones. [1063] During this month, the existing code was also to be replaced by a new and more secret system. [1064]
276. Japan Discriminates Against Dutch Firms.
Meanwhile, in Tokyo, agreements with Dutch business interests were reached as of June 5, 1941, and negotiations were begun with the leaders of the Japan‑South Seas General Merchandise Export Guild. In order to insure the Guild's participation and concurrence in Japanese trade negotiations, it was stipulated that its branches in Japan should not be assessed by the Finance Ministry, as were the Dutch firms. The Japanese anticipated that this would dissatisfy Dutch business establishments in Japan, though other Japanese export guilds would probably join the agreement because of the new conditions. [1065]
On previous occasions Japanese guilds had refused to admit Dutch firms, but in late June 1941, as a result of Tokyo's intercession, the Dutch received better treatment from the guilds. [1066]
277. Japanese Business Methods in the East Indies.
Tokyo was informed on June 9, 1941 that branches of the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Nomura, Iwai, and Kasho companies in Batavia had made competitive offers for June loadings of rubber, and immediate counteraction was suggested. [1067]
[1059] II, 1056.
[1060] II, 1057.
[1061] II, 1058.
[1062] II, 1059.
[1063] II, 1060.
[1064] II, 1061.
[1065] II, 1062.
[1066] II, 1063.
[1067] II, 1064.
192
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Three members of a large Japanese banking and investment corporation had gone to the Netherlands East Indies to establish a joint stock company dealing with rubber plantations in Borneo and Soerabaya. Directing the Japanese Minister to obtain another month's stay in the East Indies for these gentlemen, Tokyo, on June 12, 1941, expressed the hope that they would accomplish their objective. By such close supervision of Japanese business interests was Japan striving to control the East Indies' rubber market. [1068]
278. Japan Foresees the Discontinuance of Negotiations.
Tokyo stated on June 14, 1941 that it was becoming impossible for the two countries to successfully carry on further negotiations, since the reply of the Dutch East Indies' authorities reserved the right to alter at will the export volume of those materials which the Japanese regarded as indispensable. Japan asserted that no international agreement could be made on the basis of such an attitude.
Although the Dutch claimed that the object of its foreign policy was based on furthering the progress and prosperity of its own peoples, Japan felt that the Netherlands East Indies could accomplish much more by firmly establishing commercial cooperation with Japan, and in this way contributing to the peace of the Far East. Claiming to be the economical benefactor of the Dutch East Indies, Japan insisted that merely out of consideration for the unity of purpose existing between the two countries, it had contributed generously to the development of these islands. [1069]
279. Japan Plans to Publicize the Discontinuance of Its Negotiations.
Batavian authorities revealed to the Japanese Minister on June 14, 1941 that Tokyo was planning to publish the results of the negotiations between the two countries without first informing the various Dutch authorities that a diplomatic rupture was inevitable. The Japanese Minister at Batavia warned his Foreign Office that the result of such unilateral action would be detrimental to future agreements. [1070] Tokyo replied on June 14, 1941 that since the negotiations had failed, publicity in regard to the matter was solely a responsibility of Tokyo and was no concern of the Dutch.
The Japanese also pointed out that during the meetings of November 1940, when a compromise had been reached regarding the purchase of petroleum, joint communiqués issued by Dutch petroleum interests had advised the public of the quantities involved. Furthermore, Tokyo stated that the Netherlands Indies, according to authoritative intelligence, had kept the United States and Great Britain constantly informed regarding every detail during the discussions.
In addition the Japanese were indignant because the Netherlands East Indies had sent to its ministry in Tokyo both the Japanese proposal of May 14, 1941, and the Netherlands' reply of June 6, 1941 in plain text. [1071] This was very irritating to the Japanese because their code clerks in Batavia had spent ten hours in enciphering the message which the Dutch had already transmitted in plain text. [1072] In view of the dangers to their cryptographic systems from this procedure, Tokyo thereafter permitted its representatives to send foreign text messages in a simpler code system or even in plain text. [1073]
[1068] II, 1065.
[1069] II, 1035.
[1070] II, 1066.
[1071] II, 1067.
[1072] II, 1068.
[1073] II, 1069.
193
280. Japanese Minister in Batavia Protests Against Tokyo's Procedure.
Japanese Minister Daihyo in Batavia warned Tokyo on June 16, 1941 that if the Japanese were to publish the results of the conferences with the Dutch government, extreme care must be taken in wording the report lest a bad impression be created, particularly since they were breaking off negotiations with the Dutch. The Foreign Office in Tokyo should not give the impression that Japanese public opinion, contrary to the policies of the Japanese government, was in any way controlling its actions, since this would impair the dignity of Japan.
Because there were at least 7,000 Japanese living in the Netherlands East Indies, Minister Daihyo desired to continue normal relations, at least with the Dutch government. At the same time, however, he pointed out that to declare openly that Consul General Ishizawa was to continue the negotiations after the negotiations had failed would be a black mark against Japanese prestige. Therefore, until more natural circumstances permitted, Minister Daihyo suggested that no revelation of the Japanese desire for further talks with the Dutch be made. While the needs of Japan demanded that the petroleum question be settled immediately, it could not be considered separately, since it was but one part of the trade negotiations. [1074]
281. Tokyo Accedes to Minister Daihyo's Request.
Tokyo replied promptly to Minister Daihyo's protest on June 16, 1941, and requested him to assure the Dutch East Indies that any further negotiations would not be an attempt to save the Japanese Cabinet from embarrassment. By discontinuing the talks and recalling its representatives, Tokyo was endeavoring to prevent the rise of circumstances which might infuriate the Japanese people and turn them against the Dutch East Indies. In addition, the Japanese government wished to avoid giving the world the impression that normal relations with the Dutch East Indies had been disrupted, and that the two countries were not at swords' points. Therefore, Japanese Consul General Ishizawa was to indicate in any public announcements that discussions would be continued from time to time with the Dutch. [1075]
282. The Netherlands East Indies and Japan Issue a Joint Communiqué (June 17, 1941).
On June 17, 1941, after a conference between Mr. Yoshizawa, Mr. Ishizawa, Mr. van Mook and Mr. Hoogstraten which did not change the answer of the Netherlands in any way, a joint communiqué was issued as follows:
Both the Netherland and the Japanese delegations greatly regret that the economic negotiations, which has been conducted between them, has unfortunately come to no satisfactory result. It is needless, however, to add that the discontinuation of the present negotiation will lead to no change in the normal relations between the Netherlands Indies and Japan. [1076]
Although no agreement had been drawn up between the two governments as a result of their extended conferences, Foreign Minister Matsuoka expressed the opinion on June 18, 1941 that the Japanese would be able to obtain through ordinary business deals the types of goods that the Dutch considered unimportant. However, as a political gesture to warn the Dutch that Japan needed vital raw materials, the Japanese representative, Mr. Yoshizawa, urged the Governor General of the Indies to reconsider his stand. Nothing came of this, and the Japanese negotiators were ordered to withdraw. [1077]
[1074] II, 1070.
[1075] II, 1071.
[1076]Hubertus J. van Mook—op. cit., p. 122.
[1077] II, 1072.
194
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
283. Japan's Urgent Need for Petroleum and Tin.
In view of the Japanese need for petroleum, on June 18, 1941 the Chief of the Japanese Fuel Bureau requested his petroleum representative, Mr. Ito, to remain in Batavia even after other delegates had returned home. Since the international situation was extremely delicate, he directed Mr. Ito to obtain fulfillment of oil contracts which had already been made by the Dutch.
Mr. Matsuoka promised that Japan would not make any direct demands for future oil purchases or for the development of oil fields in the East Indies. [1078] But on June 21, 1941, the Japanese Consul General was instructed by Tokyo to protest immediately to the Dutch authorities against the concentration of Dutch oil products and transportation in British hands. [1079]
To take advantage of any possible diplomatic change after the breakdown of negotiations in June 1941, the Japanese desired to keep their commercial representatives in Batavia so as to be able to renew negotiations for oil rights with the Dutch. Problems other than oil rights, according to the Chief of the Japanese Fuel Bureau, were to be given secondary considerations for the time being. [1080]
A difference of opinion arose on June 19, 1941 between two Japanese representatives in Batavia. Mr. Hatanaka felt that because the negotiations had been discontinued, the acquisition of raw materials could be handled by the local branch of Mitsui, and Mr. Ito could return to Tokyo, leaving Mr. Hatanaka to carry on alone. On the other hand, Mr. Ito believed that the Dutch were just about to accept the Japanese separate proposal and wished, therefore, to remain until the affair could be finished. [1081] But on June 22, 1941, Mr. Ito reported that he was returning to Tokyo since he could do nothing more concerning the petroleum question. [1082]
By virtue of the rupture of the negotiations, Mr. van Mook, the Director of Economic Affairs in the East Indies, had explained that the negotiators had no authority to enter discussions pertaining to other matters of trade. Thus, questions regarding the shipment of fuel would come as usual under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines and would be discussed by competent industrialists. However, Mr. van Mook pointed out that at present the Bureau had been divested of the authority to deal with such matters because of the political aspects involved. Regardless of whatever point of view the Japanese might take concerning future acquisition of rights and interests, Mr. van Mook insisted that present agreements were impossible. [1083]
The withdrawal of Saito, a Japanese fuel negotiator, a few weeks later attested to the belief of Japanese authorities that the decision was irrevocable. [1084] Nevertheless, some time later on July 30, 1941, the Chief of the Netherlands East Indies Trade Bureau assured the Japanese Minister that his government had no intention of abrogating the existing oil agreement; nor did he believe that the Dutch oil company would refuse to sell the product. Regarding this latter point, the Japanese official stated that the company was delaying the loading of oil for which payment had already been made. Assuring the Japanese Minister that the company was undoubtedly discussing the provisions which called for payment in dollars, the Dutch official stated that Mr. van Mook and representatives of the oil company were to confer on the following day. Although company officials would be heard before any decision were made, it was hoped that an agreement, satisfactory to all parties, would be concluded. [1085]
[1078] II, 1073.
[1079] II, 1074.
[1080] II, 1075.
[1081] II, 1076, 1077.
[1082] II, 1078.
[1083] II, 1079.
[1084] II, 1080.
[1085] II, 1081.
195
As a result of Mr. Ito's report, [1086] loan the Chief of the Fuel Section, expressing his appreciation for their difficult experiences, directed both Mr. Ito and Mr. Hatanaka to return home. [1087] A report from Minister Daihyo, which stressed the futility of keeping Japanese oil negotiators in Batavia in the face of the Dutch refusal to deal with them, probably had much to do with their return. [1088]
The Japanese were concerned about other vital materials as well as oil. Though the Mitsubishi Company had previously obtained a year's contract to export 3,000 tons of tin from the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch had reduced that amount to a mere 2,300 tons. However, even after the negotiations had been broken off, the Japanese were hopeful that the Dutch might change their uncompromising attitude concerning tin and manganese. [1089]
284. The Netherlands Indies Reduces Shipping to Japan.
Mr. Ishizawa reported on June 21, 1941 that the Dutch were cutting down on all shipping to Japan in an attempt to apply a wartime embargo act. Instructions had been issued by the Finance Minister to limit material sent to Japan to 20,000 tons per month. According to the Japanese, this reduction of shipping was connected with Netherlands national defense and had been ordered by Dutch shipping authorities in New York, and therefore, it was hard to discover the reasons for it. [1090] In order to conceal Japanese purchases in the East Indies, on June 21, 1941 Mr. Ishizawa suggested that all telegrams regarding such matters be sent secretly to him in Batavia. [1091]
285. Japan Suspects American Support of Netherlands Indies.
Because Holland was one of the nations joined against the Axis, and because its own fundamental policies were closely akin to those of England and the United States, the Netherlands East Indies was greatly affected by the position of the United States in regard to the Japanese "New Order" in Asia. As early as June 22, 1941, according to the Japanese Ambassador in Rome, an intelligence report, sent to the Vatican by the Apostolic Delegate to Batavia, had indicated that the United States, at first, had brought pressure to bear upon the Netherlands East Indies in a scheme to obtain an excellent bargaining position, so as to force Japan into neutrality, if the United States went to war.
Later, however, the United States, with Great Britain, had made the Netherlands East Indies part of a defensive line that included the Philippines, China and Thailand, and thus, by cooperative encirclement, had attempted to force Japan to accept its material aid. Because of this action, according to Ambassador Horikiri's version of the report, the Netherlanders became still more certain that Japan would attack their territory. [1092]
Military cooperation between America, Great Britain, and the Netherlands government was announced by a Japanese report of July 17, 1941, which also indicated that an American air base was being built in Papua, New Guinea! [1093] The Japanese Minister to Batavia reported a
[1086] II, 1078.
[1087] II, 1082.
[1088] II, 1083.
[1089] II, 1084.
[1090] II, 1085.
[1091] II, 1086.
[1092] II, 1087.
[1093] II, 1088.
196
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
week later, on July 26, 1941, that if the United States should carry out a general embargo, the Dutch people were convinced that Japan would extend its southward march to include Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. On the other hand, although there was to be a blackout for three days of an area centering on Batavia and Baitenzorugu in preparation for any future air raid, the people of Batavia, as a whole, showed little concern over a possible breach of diplomatic relations with Japan. [1094]
286. Reaction of Netherlands Indies to German‑Russian War.
After war began between Germany and Soviet Russia, the Japanese Consul in Batavia stated in an interview with Mr. Hoogstraten on June 23, 1941 that now the Dutch could cease being anxious over the re‑exportation to Germany of material purchased in the Indies, and that they could ship supplies to Japan in an unlimited amount. Still uncertain of the Japanese position, however, the Dutch were not willing to make agreements on the hypothesis that Japan would not aid its German partner. On the other hand the Japanese feared that the Netherlanders would lend their full support to Russia, because they were fighting Germany.
According to the Japanese Minister in Batavia, the Dutch believed that the conflict between Germany and Russia would serve to dissipate Nazi strength, while the fighting power of the British, aided by the United States, would increase. In answer to the Japanese Consul's statement that Europe would then come under the control of Commissar Stalin instead of Hitler, Mr. Hoogstraten asserted that Russia had no great ambition in western Europe. Furthermore, with the destruction of Hitlerism and the cooperation of Great Britain, his mother country, Holland, could be restored. [1095]
When the Japanese Consul was questioned by Mr. Hoogstraten regarding Japan's attitude toward the Russo‑German conflict, he replied that the Tripartite Pact with Germany stipulated that the relations between the respective treaty powers and Soviet Russia were in no way to be affected by the alliance; therefore, the present hostilities would have no immediate effect upon Japan. In spite of the reassurance which the Japanese gave Dutch officials regarding their neutrality in the European war, the Japanese Minister still feared that the Netherlands East Indies would become more anti‑Japanese and that exports to Japan would be reduced to permit large‑scale shipments to Soviet Russia. He suggested that Japan formulate and maintain a definite policy with regard to this situation. [1096]
Since there was always the possibility of Japan's attacking Russia, Mr. Ishizawa made inquiries to sound out the effect of such a move upon the Netherlands East Indies. In his report to Tokyo on July 15, 1941 he announced that if Japan did not commit any direct hostile acts against the Netherlands Indies, there was little chance of war between the two countries, although further regulation of exports to Japan would be inevitable if a Japanese‑Russian war broke out. Mr. Ishizawa pointed to the friendly attitude of the Netherlanders toward Italian residents, in spite of Italy's alliance with Germany, as proof that the Japanese would be treated in the same way. [1097]
[1094] II, 1089.
[1096] II, 1090.
[1096] II, Ibid.
[1087] II, 1091.
197
287. After Effects of Discontinuance of Japanese‑Dutch Negotiations.
Ten days after the publication of the joint communiqué which announced the discontinuance of the Japanese‑Dutch economic negotiations, the Japanese Minister in Batavia, on June 26, 1941 reported to Tokyo that the atmosphere had become more favorable to Japan and that Japanese residents in the East Indies were not much perturbed. [1098] However, the Japanese-Dutch Society was to be closed in late July 1941, [1099] and about July 15, 1941 the Mitsubishi Company ordered its officials in Batavia to evacuate their families. [1100]
As a result of this prospective exodus, the Japanese Minister inquired whether the order of the Mitsubishi Company stemmed from the Japanese Foreign Office or was issued independently. In addition, the Mitsubishi representative informed his home office that general conditions were calm in the East Indies, and for this reason Japanese families did not desire to return to Japan. He also pointed out that the sending of evacuation orders in plain language, as had been done in this instance, would disturb the Dutch government, would not make it change its decision, and would only damage Japanese interests by lessening production. [1101]
288. Netherlands Indies Resent Japanese Intelligence Activities.
When the second Japanese economic mission had come to the Netherlands East Indies, Colonels Maeda and Oga, and Lt. Col. Ishii of the Japanese army had accompanied it. The Netherlands army had been very disturbed by their arrival, but the Dutch refrained from refusing them admittance to avoid affronting Japan. However, after Minister Yoshizawa departed with his associates, on June 27, 1941 Mr. Hoogstraten pointed out that the officers had been more engrossed in inspecting all parts of the Netherlands Indies than in taking part in the negotiations, and he requested Mr. Ishizawa to arrange for their departure on a ship leaving for Japan on July 3, 1941. [1102]
Tokyo inquired, on July 3, 1941, whether the refusal of the Netherlands Indies to permit a certain Japanese naval officer to return was based on the undesirability of the officer or on a general policy of not accepting Japanese language officers. [1103] The refusal of the Dutch to permit the return of a Japanese Vice Consul was because of his previous activities among the radical elements of the native population. [1104]
Whether the visit of the Japanese army officers had been valuable in securing vital information regarding military strength in the East Indies cannot be definitely ascertained, but it was known that the activities of Japanese spies in that area were attaining some measure of success. According to one spy report on July 18, 1941, details of airfields south of Batavia, west of Serang and on the western tip of Java were known. [1105]
Cooperation between the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, England and the United States was noted in a Japanese message from Batavia on July 18, 1941. United States naval officers stationed in a certain section of Soerabaya and Java, as well as British and Australian army officers in Bandon and Batavia, were conducting military training at this time. It was suspected that at other points on the island, allied officers acted as instructors or liaison officers. [1106]
[1098] II, 1092.
[1099] II, 1093.
[1100] II, 1094.
[1101] II, 1095.
[1102] II, 1096.
[1103] II, 1097.
[1104] II, 1098.
[1105] II, 1099.
[1106] II, 1100.
198
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
In order to direct the military efforts of the Dutch Indies, Sir Robert Brooke‑Popham, the British Commander in Chief of the Far East forces, and a United States Naval aviation officer, Normer, as well as one officer each from the Australian army and navy, arrived in that vicinity some time before July 23, 1941. [1107]
289. The Netherlands East Indies Reduces Exports to Japan.
Though business conditions appeared to be normal, [1108] cancellation or postponement of exports which had already been agreed to by the Dutch drew protests from Tokyo. Listing palm oil, kapok, tannin, scrap iron, rubber and kopra among the products affected by the reduction of exports to Japan, Japanese representatives in Batavia insisted in mid‑July 1941 that the Dutch had failed to carry out their contracts since in the case of all vital products, almost half the quantity ordered had been stopped. [1109]
The Dutch authorities promised to reconsider their decision in view of these previous commitments. [1110] Hoping to receive as much as possible, Tokyo directed on July 18, 1941 that all articles already contracted for were to be exported immediately, aboard the Nichiran Maru and the Chirubuto Maru which had been assigned to the Netherlands East Indies. [1111]
290. Dutch Reprisals Against Japanese Communications.
Around July 26, 1941 Tokyo was informed that the Netherlands East Indies threatened to carry out reprisals if Tokyo decreed that only English or Japanese could be spoken in telephone conversations to the East Indies. The Netherlands government in turn would forbid the use of the Japanese language over its international telephone wires. The Dutch put the order prohibiting the use of the Japanese language into effect on July 29, 1941, and Tokyo hastened to negotiate with Batavia immediately in an attempt to have it retracted. [1112]
291. Japan Allays Dutch Fears Concerning a Japanese‑British War.
According to a statement made on July 26, 1941 by Mr. Utuheren of the Dutch Immigration Office, the occupation of southern French Indo-China by Japan had damaged Japanese relations with England and the United States, and if war broke out between the Japanese and the English, there was little doubt that the Netherlands East Indies would fight on the side of England. The Japanese Minister replied that the United States and England had been increasing their assistance to China, and that the Chinese, in turn, were hindering Japan from procuring necessary French Indo‑Chinese goods. Though asserting that if Japan had not acted immediately, British economic and military influence would have dominated French Indo-China, the Japanese Minister expressed the opinion that the possibility of war between Japan and
England was remote. Certain Netherlands Indies' officials were also convinced that Great Britain and Japan would not war over the French Indo-China issue, but they considered the concentration of Japanese
[1107] II, 1101.
[1108] II, 1102.
[1109] II, 1103.
[1110] II, 1104.
[1111] II, 1105.
[1112] II, 1106, 1107.
199
forces in the southern part of French Indo-China to be a potential threat toward the Netherlands Indies. A meeting of important officials at the Governor's mansion made it apparent that the Netherlands Indies was giving deep consideration to its official attitude regarding the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China. [1113]
292. Japan Releases a Confiscated Cargo.
In an attempt to checkmate any movement of war materials to the Chungking government, in the early part of July 1941 the Japanese in Shanghai had held up and investigated a ship with a cargo of machinery purchased by the Dutch. This occasioned a protest from the Netherlands East Indies and Great Britain. Stressing the importance of the matter, Mr. Hoogstraten, the Dutch Commerce Bureau Chief, had then requested that the machinery be handed over immediately to the Netherlanders. [1114]
According to the Japanese, the exportation had been illegal, since no permit had been obtained from the proper military authorities, [1115] and in addition, the vessel had acted contrary to the orders of the Japanese water police. Furthermore, a bank connected with this transaction was in alliance with the Chungking regime. However, since Japan had no wish to incur the hostility of such an important trading country as the Netherlands East Indies, and because Japanese enterprises in the area were too valuable to be endangered by retaliation for one shipment of goods, Tokyo decided against confiscating this machinery. [1116]
On July 25, 1941 the Netherlands Indies' director, Mr. van Mook was informed that the machinery had been released and he expressed his appreciation to Japanese authorities. [1117] A promise of increased trade had previously been made by the Netherlands Indies' authorities who agreed not to transfer the machinery in question to Chungking. [1118]
293. The Netherlands Indies Freezes Japanese Funds.
The Netherlands Indies learned on July 26, 1941 that the United States and Great Britain had suspended monetary and economic intercourse with Japan. After much hurried activity, the Netherlands Indies was able to issue measures, on July 28, 1941, which suspended the monetary agreement and all monetary transactions with Japan, applied the Export Licensing Law to all exports to the Japanese Empire, Manchuria, occupied China, and Indo-China, and subjected all banks to a system of permits affecting monetary or credit transactions with Japanese subjects. [1119]
294. Economic Cooperation of the Netherlands Indies With England and the United States.
The Japanese Minister in Batavia reported to Tokyo on July 28, 1941 that despite some laxness in enforcing economic sanctions, the Netherlands East Indies was cooperating with England and the United States in economic warfare against Japan. Furthermore, Mr. van Mook
[1113] II, 1108.
[1114] II, 1109.
[1115] II, 1110.
[1116] II, 1111.
[1117] II, 1112.
[1118] II, 1110.
[1119] Hubertus J. van Mock‑op. cit., pp. 126‑127.
200
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
asserted that if the Japanese continued their aggression, the Indies might conclude a military alliance with the United States and England. Nevertheless, the Japanese Minister believed that the Netherlands Indies was anxious to avert an attack by Japan. [1120]
Since the betterment of Japanese‑Dutch relations was a matter of extreme urgency, Mr. Hoogstraten and Mr. Ishizawa met on July 30, 1941 to seek a solution of the problem. To explain Japan's southward sweep into French Indo-China, Mr. Ishizawa stated that its purpose was to cooperate with the government of France in facilitating the defense of that territory. However, Mr. Hoogstraten assumed that Japan's antagonism toward his country was increasing because Japan had established military bases there.
In spite of Japanese protests that no ulterior motives were involved, the Netherlands East Indies viewed Japanese army, naval, and air bases in the southern part of French Indo-China as a threat to her territorial integrity. At this point Mr. Ishizawa reminded Mr. Hoogstraten that the Dutch had boasted of the firm establishment of an American‑British‑Chinese‑Dutch joint front, and in view of the strong defense which the Dutch had attained by these alliances, Japan could not understand their fear of Axis strength.
In spite of the Japanese Minister's remarks, Mr. Hoogstraten insisted that curtailments of military supplies to Japan were necessary for the defense of the Netherlands Indies. Mr. Ishizawa then advised Mr. Hoogstraten that Japan would find other means of obtaining these essential materials. [1121]
After his conversation with Mr. Hoogstraten on July 30, 1941, the Japanese Minister in Batavia declared emphatically that as long as Japanese forces remained in French Indo-China, the Netherlands Indies would treat Japan as an enemy. In order to combat the punitive trade embargoes imposed by the Dutch, he suggested certain Japanese counter‑measures. Although the freezing order regarding Japan's assets had thus far been strictly enforced, the Japanese Minister felt that since the Netherlanders were also being greatly inconvenienced by it, negotiations between Mr. Imagawa of the Specie Bank, and officials of the Administrative Bureau and the Java Bank might produce a favorable solution. In the meantime, however, trade between the two countries was becoming more restricted, and Mr. Ishizawa felt that decisive measures should be initiated against the Netherlands East Indies. [1122]
295. Japan Retaliates by Freezing Netherlands Assets.
In retaliation for the economic measures which the Dutch had taken against the Japanese, Tokyo froze Netherlands assets throughout the Japanese Empire. On July 30, 1941, Mr. Hoogstraten and the Japanese Minister at Batavia discussed various points connected with the freezing orders of both countries. The Dutch official claimed that the Japanese should permit the exportation of not only goods which had been paid for, but also goods under contract, since their title had been transferred to the Netherlands East Indies. If, as a result of the freezing order, the Dutch merchants lost the entire stock of goods purchased from Japan, Mr. Hoogstraten warned that the Netherlands East Indies would use the frozen Japanese funds as collateral for the twelve million guilders involved. [1123]
Replying that Japan did not intend to prevent shipment of goods which had been already purchased, the Japanese Minister stated that his country was at present experimenting with the first export embargo it had ever imposed. Furthermore, he insisted that the Netherlands' government had no justification for taking any retaliatory measures against Japan.
[1120] II, 1113.
[1121] II, 1114.
[1122] II, 1115.
[1123] II, 1116.
201
Mr. Hoogstraten assured Mr. Ishizawa that if Dutch merchants were permitted to ship their goods from Japan, not only would certain Japanese funds be released, but sugar and similar products would also be shipped from the Netherlands Indies to Japan. However, because the Japanese occupation of the southern part of French Indo-China constituted a direct threat to the Indies, a comparatively strict limitation would still be observed on the exportation of petroleum and other war materials in which the Japanese Minister was particularly interested. Regarding the abrogation of the petroleum agreement, Mr. Hoogstraten stated that his government had no intention of permitting the oil companies to export the undelivered portion of the oil under contract. [1124]
Since the Japanese Minister in Batavia felt that the Netherlands East Indies would still continue to tighten restrictions on exported commodities to Japan, he again suggested on August 1, 1941 that strict counter‑measures be taken. Knowing that an embargo against food supplies, such as salt‑fish from French Indo-China, would give rise to a serious problem for the Netherlands Indies, the Japanese planned to prevent this and other essential items from reaching the East Indies. [1125]
Further discussion by the Japanese Minister with Mr. Hoogstraten finally won some concessions, according to a report to Tokyo on August 2, 1941, for the Netherlands Indies granted permission for one shipment of rubber, tin, and ilmonite. [1126] Nevertheless, during the first few days of August 1941, growing anxiety was evident among Japanese residents. Because of the constant stream of applicants for passage aboard ships bound for Japan, the South Seas Shipping Company considered dispensing with cargoes until Japanese nationals could be evacuated. [1127]
296. Japanese Nationals Are Evacuated From The Netherlands Indies.
On previous occasions, at the direction of the Japanese Minister, the leaders of Japanese associations had advised Japanese residents owning firmly established enterprises to remain in the Netherlands Indies and continue their business. On July 31, 1941, however, he planned to advise many of them to return home since in the event that improvement in Japanese-Dutch relations became impossible, a disorderly evacuation would disgrace Japan. Judging from recent trends, and because of the danger of arrest for Japanese residents, it was also felt that all Japanese subjects acquainted with the situation in the Netherlands Indies and able to speak the Malayan language would be of great value to the military authorities, and should, therefore, return to Japan and register immediately. [1128]
297. East Indian Merchants Purchase Japanese Stocks.
Upon hearing rumors that the government of the Netherlands Indies would freeze Japanese funds, Chinese and Arabian merchants in the East Indies realized that Japanese merchants would encounter difficulties in future importations and would be interested, therefore, in cash
[1124] II, Ibid.
[1125] II, 1117.
[1126] II, 1118.
[1127] II, 1119.
[1128] II, 1115.
202
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
transactions. These traders attempted to buy up all the articles which Japanese firms had on hand, and in this way obtained a monopoly on many materials. The Netherlands Indies' government, fearing the increased prices that would result from such reckless buying, prohibited the transfer of woven and knitted goods, fabricated materials and other articles. Although these restrictions were designated to curb the transactions of the Chinese and other merchants, the Japanese Minister felt that inflation was now an imminent danger in the East Indies, and would cause more trouble to the Dutch themselves than to Japan. [1129]
298. Japan is Urged to Further Retaliation Against the Dutch.
On August 3, 1941 the Japanese Minister in Batavia reported to Tokyo that the Netherlands East Indies was concerned about food for the Dutch residents in Japan, and about the shipment of goods out of Japan which had been contracted and paid for by Netherlands Indies' merchants. Although Tokyo had so far been indecisive concerning these questions, Dutch firms nevertheless placed considerable reliance on the influence of Mr. Ishizawa.
Believing that Japan's delay was responsible for the issuance of the Netherlands freezing order, Mr. Ishizawa suggested again that Japan retaliate immediately when any actions contrary to her national well‑being were undertaken by the Netherlands Indies. He requested, therefore, on August 3, 1941 that decisions reached by the Foreign Office concerning such action be wired to him without any delay. [1130] Furthermore, if time were wasted while he waited for specific instructions, a general embargo might be imposed by the Dutch with the result that Japan would be prevented from obtaining even those materials which were procurable. Such action on the part of the Dutch would possibly freeze Japanese assets indefinitely. [1131]
Monday, May 25, 2009
Inserting a gene 2.ins.01001 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Inserting a gene into gut cells in mice enabled those cells to take over the pancreas’s job, producing insulin after meals, according to unpublished research announced June 18 in San Diego at the Biotechnology Industry Organization International Convention. The work may offer a novel way to treat diabetes.
"This is the first time that we've engineered a tissue that is not the pancreas to manufacture insulin" in animals, says researcher Anthony Cheung, a molecular biologist and cofounder of enGene, a biotechnology company based in Vancouver, British Columbia.
"It's going to be very beneficial to patients," comments Christopher Rhodes, research director of the Kovler Diabetes Center at the University of Chicago, who enGene asked to critique the research. "It's a very promising approach." Cheung says that he and his colleagues hope to begin safety trials in people by 2010.
People with diabetes don't produce enough insulin to properly control their blood sugar. Often, the pancreatic cells that produce the insulin have become damaged, either from attack by the immune system or from chronic overtaxing because of poor diet.
"This is the first time that we've engineered a tissue that is not the pancreas to manufacture insulin" in animals, says researcher Anthony Cheung, a molecular biologist and cofounder of enGene, a biotechnology company based in Vancouver, British Columbia.
"It's going to be very beneficial to patients," comments Christopher Rhodes, research director of the Kovler Diabetes Center at the University of Chicago, who enGene asked to critique the research. "It's a very promising approach." Cheung says that he and his colleagues hope to begin safety trials in people by 2010.
People with diabetes don't produce enough insulin to properly control their blood sugar. Often, the pancreatic cells that produce the insulin have become damaged, either from attack by the immune system or from chronic overtaxing because of poor diet.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
insightful 3.ins.0001002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
From CT, PET and MRI to the original X, a vast alphabetical arsenal of tools tells doctors what is going on inside the body. But despite their successes, these tools often fail to detect the subtle changes that signal the imminent onset of illness. Mischief at the molecular level often evades doctors’ current imaging and detection abilities. So for sensing such changes, biomedical scientists are taking a tip from chemists. Using a method known as Raman spectroscopy, medical detectives are moving ever closer to exploiting the power of light to improve disease detection.
Long used in labs, spectroscopy employs light and other types of electromagnetic radiation to analyze matter. The various spectroscopic techniques reveal a molecule’s unique chemical fingerprint by measuring the wavelengths of light that the molecule absorbs or emits, or by tracking how radiation scatters after interacting with a molecule. For 30 years, scientists have been eager to harness the power of Raman spectroscopy, a type of scattering spectroscopy, to image the body at the level of individual molecules. The method holds promise for pinpointing the beginnings of dental cavities and tumors. And it could even help forensic investigators nab killers sooner by lifting latent fingerprints from corpses.
A variety of researchers, from dentists and doctors to chemists, now report some of the first successes using Raman spectroscopy to probe chemicals and minerals within and on living — and dead — bodies. “Raman spectroscopy is a very powerful tool,” says Cristina Zavaleta, a molecular imaging radiologist at Stanford University. But, she adds, the technique still needs some time to develop.
In recent years, scientists have rapidly overcome many of the hitches holding up the widespread use of Raman-based instruments. That progress leads many to speculate that within a few years doctors and dentists could be wheeling new, Raman-based tools into the examining room, or detectives could even be driving them to the scene of a murder.
Imaging humans’ insides
In Raman spectroscopy, scientists shoot a laser light at a target molecule and measure how the wavelengths of scattered light, in the form of photons, coming off the target compare with the laser’s original wavelength. Only one in 10 million of the photons hitting the target shows an increase or decrease in wavelength. Detecting these rare photons is the challenge — and ultimately the payoff — for scientists seeking to harness the Raman effect for clinical applications.
The wavelength change is called the Raman effect in honor of Indian physicist Chandrasekhara Venkata Raman, who first showed in the 1920s that measuring the changes in wavelengths of scattered photons can help scientists identify a compound’s molecular makeup. He won the Nobel Prize in physics in 1930 for his work. Currently, geologists, chemists and archaeologists use the technique to study minerals in the soil, identify new materials and determine the pigments in ancient paintings, manuscripts and other artifacts.
“At this point, Raman spectroscopy is good for surface scans,” says David Batchelder, a Raman researcher from the University of Leeds in England. Unlike X-rays and CT scans, existing Raman tools have yet to let doctors look inside the body. “To penetrate deep into tissues,” Batchelder says, “the equipment has to be very good.”
But Stanford University researchers, including Zavaleta, are on track to engineer inward-probing Raman tools. The key, the scientists discovered, is in using nanoparticles. By wrapping cancer antibodies around gold nanoparticles, the team used Raman spectroscopy to detect tumors in a living mouse.
Zavaleta and colleagues injected the nanoparticles into the mouse. Each specific antibody attached to a specific type of tumor cell. When the researchers shone laser light across the animal’s body, the cells with attached antibody-coated nanoparticles showed a change in wavelength compared with the laser.
Signals coming from the antibodies are very weak, Zavaleta says. But the gold in the nanoparticles boosts the signal because the laser excites the gold cores and the metal actually shows an intensity increase in its surrounding electric fields. The Stanford team scanned the mouse’s body for the excited electric fields and pinpointed the locations of the nanoparticles using a Raman microscope.
The microscope looks like a standard optical microscope. But researchers added the laser and a sensitive detector to the instrument to read the spectral fingerprints of the nanoparticles and then compute where in the body there were excited electric fields and changes in photons’ wavelengths. Ultimately, the team’s device formed an image of the mouse’s internal tumors.
And, because the injected nanoparticles attached to different tumor types, the scientists were able, in one scan, to identify where different cancer cells were in the mouse’s body. That single scan for many types of cancer is the novel aspect of this research, Zavaleta says. She and her colleagues reported their progress in the April 15 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
Aside from CT scans and X-rays, doctors are using fluorescence imaging with quantum dots to take a peek at the finer details of the human body. But the Raman technique, Zavaleta says, could exceed the capabilities of quantum dots. Doctors would need to inject only one one-thousandth the number of nanoparticles required for imaging using quantum dots. Showing that scientists can image living subjects with fewer nanoparticles has never been done successfully before, the Stanford radiologist says.
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Enlargemagnify
TESTING TEETHDental researchers shine laser light on an extracted tooth. A Raman spectrometer (not shown) will measure scattered photons bouncing off the tooth and read the spectral fingerprint of the tooth¹s minerals to detect signs of damage.Choo-Smith
Oncologists could eventually use Raman spectroscopy during surgery to scan diseased tissue. Injecting the new nanoparticles or a variation of them into the body during an operation would show surgeons where the tiniest abnormal cells are just beginning to form. The surgeon could remove these developing cancer cells and perhaps prevent future growth and spread of the tumor, Zavaleta says.
Raman spectroscopy could also replace visual checks for tumors and diseases like cervical cancer. “In Pap smears doctors just look for cancer cells,” says Batchelder, “but certain types of tumors are hard to identify. Raman technology could pick out the particular molecular processes related with this type or a particular type of tumor, making it easier to catch.”
The developing technique, though, will never completely replace PET scans, MRI, ultrasound and other imaging methods, Zavaleta says. Each technique brings its own advantages to figuring out what’s going on inside the body. Yet some doctors are trying to rid their offices of X-ray machines, at least the doctors that poke at people’s teeth.
No drilling for the dentist
In addition to ridding the body of cancer cells, Raman spectroscopy may rid dentists of their drills.
No one likes having cavities filled. So, to avoid putting patients “under the drill,” Lin-P’ing Choo-Smith and her colleagues at the National Research Council Canada’s Institute for Biodiagnostics in Winnipeg are studying how to use Raman spectroscopy to spot cavities much sooner than currently possible.
Working with extracted teeth, the Canadian dental researchers have detected tiny cavities by using Raman spectroscopy to search for slight decreases in calcium hydroxyapatite, the dominant mineral component of teeth. The team presented its latest work at a meeting in June sponsored by the European Organisation for Caries Research and then discussed it again in July at a conference of the International Association for Dental Research.
Cavities, which often result from dental caries, are spots on the tooth where minerals have leached out. Bacteria in plaque play a key role in cavity formation by producing acids that leach the minerals. With less minerals in the tooth structure, the tooth begins to dissolve and can rot.
Dentists usually use X-rays and dental probes — the metal picks that can scratch at the teeth — to detect cavities. But with these tools, dentists can detect only major damage to the tooth and cavities as big as a millimeter in size. And by this stage, Choo-Smith says, the tooth can be in pretty bad shape.
“Using Raman, however, would let dentists detect small changes in mineral levels of the tooth long before a cavity actually became a cavity,” Batchelder says. Dentists could detect precursors to cavities and weak spots with lesions only 100–250 micrometers deep, about the size of an individual grain of sand. The Raman tool might also detect troublesome spots between teeth.
Catching the problem areas at an early stage could eliminate the dentist’s need to drill, Choo-Smith says. Instead patients could self-treat the tiny, trouble areas with fluoride or antimicrobials.
Using spectroscopy coupled with an imaging technique called optical coherence tomography to detect a speck of a cavity might seem like overkill to some patients, says Cecilia Dong, a dentist at the University of Manitoba in Canada and one of Choo-Smith’s collaborators. But the more information dentists have, the more accurate their diagnoses will be. That could mean less pain for patients, she adds.
What’s more, Raman spectroscopy does not use ionizing radiation like X-rays do, so pregnant women and small children could be safely scanned, Dong notes. With no radiation exposure to worry about, dentists could use Raman testing every time a patient comes into the office. Frequent scanning, she says, will truly show dentists and hygienists who is doing their daily brushing and flossing.
But adapting Raman spectroscopy for the dentist’s office, Choo-Smith explains, would require that dentists have a portable Raman-based unit and a miniature wand or probe to use in the mouth. Engineering and manufacturing probes for reading scattering spectroscopy emissions, specifically ones small enough to scan a tooth, is one of the greatest challenges for current Raman spectroscopy researchers.
And, while ever-smaller fiber optic cables and, in medicine, nanoparticles may help scientists add Raman spectroscopy to their disease-detecting arsenal, the development work is far from over. Still, each round of probe design and research yields clearer results. Within the next year and a half, Choo-Smith expects to take prototype probes into dentists’ clinics for testing. “I think it will still be another three to five years before they will have a product to wheel into their examining rooms,” she says.
Lifting latent prints
From inside the body to inside the mouth, Raman spectroscopy shows promise for detecting the molecular fingerprints of disease. But it also could prove useful for identifying real fingerprints — such as the prints a killer leaves on a victim’s body.
“Prints are really hard to lift from corpses,” says Linda Lewis, a chemist at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. “Our goal, though, is to detect fingerprints on surfaces where they are not traditionally detected.”
Lewis is developing a device based on Raman spectroscopy that would enable detectives to trace the chemical signatures of certain residues left by human hands — on corpses or even hard-to-analyze evidence. Working with researchers at ChemImage in Pittsburgh, Pa., and the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D.C., Lewis is using silver-coated nanowires, similar to Zavaleta’s gold nanoparticles, to mark a killer’s prints, or at least, right now, human prints left on dead animal skin.
The nanowires target specific fingerprint components — such as eccrine, a watery substance that comes out of the pads of human fingers and is not well detected using current forensic methods — that give off Raman scattering emissions. “The most active signal we get right now is actually from urea,” she says.
In theory, Lewis says, detectives would spray the silver-coated nanowires onto a corpse in the field and then use a Raman microscope-laser device to scan the body. The nanowires would detect particular molecules in urea, eccrine and possibly other substances. Passing the laser over the body would trigger the silver coating on the nanowires to amplify the signals emanating from the laser’s scattered photons by changing the electric field. Using the microscope, which would register the chemical spectrum and locate the signals, the investigators could isolate a killer’s fingerprint.
Lewis says analyzing the Raman spectroscopy scans is similar to looking at the individual pixels from a picture. Not every pixel has high peaks of light on it. Similarly, not everything gives off a Raman scattering signal. When the pixels are put together, though, the image appears in a matrix of light and dark spots. On the skin, the scattering signals from the 1-by-1-inch laser-light blocks can come together to show a fingerprint, like the pixels show the image, she says. And, once the Raman tool reveals the location of the left-behind molecules, detectives could collect the print for further analysis, just as they do now from hard surfaces.
Lewis and her colleagues are currently writing up their early results on the spectroscopy device for submission to the Journal of Forensic Sciences. Her team next needs to look for prints on actual decaying bodies instead of preserved pig and human skin, she says. Scanning for prints will help her team design a Raman spectroscopy device that could detect killer’s prints left on bodies found 24 to 48 hours after death.
“We need to see if the prints decompose as the body does or if heat or other factors affect the signals we can get from the prints,” she says.
And, although the Raman spectroscopy print identification tool is still in its testing phase, Lewis says the team wants to have something ready to go in about two years.
But corpses are not the only crime scene evidence detectives could scan for the signatures of fingerprints. Investigators could also do Raman-based analyses on explosive residues from terrorist attacks or even on heavily contaminated drug evidence. “Prints are hard to lift from these places too, and we want the device to work on all tough surfaces,” Lewis says. “My far out vision, probably in 10 years, though, is to scan live skin. That would identify abuse criminals.”
But creating a forensics Raman tool for widespread use means engineering nanowires more efficiently and at a lower cost. Researchers at the Naval Research Laboratory can make small quantities of nanowires, with a lot of effort, Lewis says. “The challenge is making large batches of the silver nanowires” more quickly, she says.
Medical applications for Raman spectroscopy, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Batchelder notes, face similar delays. Don’t expect to see Raman tools in a dentist’s or doctor’s office tomorrow, he says, adding that while he has seen technology improve immensely in the past 10 years, each biomedical application for Raman-based tools has had its holdups.
For medical researchers, probe design is a struggle. No commercial companies are currently invested in developing the probes, even though there is a major market for them, dental researcher Choo-Smith says. Researchers are basically going it alone, trying to build something that will bring the sensitivity of Raman spectroscopy to the examining and operating rooms. Still, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire scientists and doctors are optimistic, and while they recognize the obstacles, most are confident that soon they will be able to add an “R” for Raman spectroscopy to the alphabetical arsenal they use to explore the human body and catch criminals.
Long used in labs, spectroscopy employs light and other types of electromagnetic radiation to analyze matter. The various spectroscopic techniques reveal a molecule’s unique chemical fingerprint by measuring the wavelengths of light that the molecule absorbs or emits, or by tracking how radiation scatters after interacting with a molecule. For 30 years, scientists have been eager to harness the power of Raman spectroscopy, a type of scattering spectroscopy, to image the body at the level of individual molecules. The method holds promise for pinpointing the beginnings of dental cavities and tumors. And it could even help forensic investigators nab killers sooner by lifting latent fingerprints from corpses.
A variety of researchers, from dentists and doctors to chemists, now report some of the first successes using Raman spectroscopy to probe chemicals and minerals within and on living — and dead — bodies. “Raman spectroscopy is a very powerful tool,” says Cristina Zavaleta, a molecular imaging radiologist at Stanford University. But, she adds, the technique still needs some time to develop.
In recent years, scientists have rapidly overcome many of the hitches holding up the widespread use of Raman-based instruments. That progress leads many to speculate that within a few years doctors and dentists could be wheeling new, Raman-based tools into the examining room, or detectives could even be driving them to the scene of a murder.
Imaging humans’ insides
In Raman spectroscopy, scientists shoot a laser light at a target molecule and measure how the wavelengths of scattered light, in the form of photons, coming off the target compare with the laser’s original wavelength. Only one in 10 million of the photons hitting the target shows an increase or decrease in wavelength. Detecting these rare photons is the challenge — and ultimately the payoff — for scientists seeking to harness the Raman effect for clinical applications.
The wavelength change is called the Raman effect in honor of Indian physicist Chandrasekhara Venkata Raman, who first showed in the 1920s that measuring the changes in wavelengths of scattered photons can help scientists identify a compound’s molecular makeup. He won the Nobel Prize in physics in 1930 for his work. Currently, geologists, chemists and archaeologists use the technique to study minerals in the soil, identify new materials and determine the pigments in ancient paintings, manuscripts and other artifacts.
“At this point, Raman spectroscopy is good for surface scans,” says David Batchelder, a Raman researcher from the University of Leeds in England. Unlike X-rays and CT scans, existing Raman tools have yet to let doctors look inside the body. “To penetrate deep into tissues,” Batchelder says, “the equipment has to be very good.”
But Stanford University researchers, including Zavaleta, are on track to engineer inward-probing Raman tools. The key, the scientists discovered, is in using nanoparticles. By wrapping cancer antibodies around gold nanoparticles, the team used Raman spectroscopy to detect tumors in a living mouse.
Zavaleta and colleagues injected the nanoparticles into the mouse. Each specific antibody attached to a specific type of tumor cell. When the researchers shone laser light across the animal’s body, the cells with attached antibody-coated nanoparticles showed a change in wavelength compared with the laser.
Signals coming from the antibodies are very weak, Zavaleta says. But the gold in the nanoparticles boosts the signal because the laser excites the gold cores and the metal actually shows an intensity increase in its surrounding electric fields. The Stanford team scanned the mouse’s body for the excited electric fields and pinpointed the locations of the nanoparticles using a Raman microscope.
The microscope looks like a standard optical microscope. But researchers added the laser and a sensitive detector to the instrument to read the spectral fingerprints of the nanoparticles and then compute where in the body there were excited electric fields and changes in photons’ wavelengths. Ultimately, the team’s device formed an image of the mouse’s internal tumors.
And, because the injected nanoparticles attached to different tumor types, the scientists were able, in one scan, to identify where different cancer cells were in the mouse’s body. That single scan for many types of cancer is the novel aspect of this research, Zavaleta says. She and her colleagues reported their progress in the April 15 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
Aside from CT scans and X-rays, doctors are using fluorescence imaging with quantum dots to take a peek at the finer details of the human body. But the Raman technique, Zavaleta says, could exceed the capabilities of quantum dots. Doctors would need to inject only one one-thousandth the number of nanoparticles required for imaging using quantum dots. Showing that scientists can image living subjects with fewer nanoparticles has never been done successfully before, the Stanford radiologist says.
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Enlargemagnify
TESTING TEETHDental researchers shine laser light on an extracted tooth. A Raman spectrometer (not shown) will measure scattered photons bouncing off the tooth and read the spectral fingerprint of the tooth¹s minerals to detect signs of damage.Choo-Smith
Oncologists could eventually use Raman spectroscopy during surgery to scan diseased tissue. Injecting the new nanoparticles or a variation of them into the body during an operation would show surgeons where the tiniest abnormal cells are just beginning to form. The surgeon could remove these developing cancer cells and perhaps prevent future growth and spread of the tumor, Zavaleta says.
Raman spectroscopy could also replace visual checks for tumors and diseases like cervical cancer. “In Pap smears doctors just look for cancer cells,” says Batchelder, “but certain types of tumors are hard to identify. Raman technology could pick out the particular molecular processes related with this type or a particular type of tumor, making it easier to catch.”
The developing technique, though, will never completely replace PET scans, MRI, ultrasound and other imaging methods, Zavaleta says. Each technique brings its own advantages to figuring out what’s going on inside the body. Yet some doctors are trying to rid their offices of X-ray machines, at least the doctors that poke at people’s teeth.
No drilling for the dentist
In addition to ridding the body of cancer cells, Raman spectroscopy may rid dentists of their drills.
No one likes having cavities filled. So, to avoid putting patients “under the drill,” Lin-P’ing Choo-Smith and her colleagues at the National Research Council Canada’s Institute for Biodiagnostics in Winnipeg are studying how to use Raman spectroscopy to spot cavities much sooner than currently possible.
Working with extracted teeth, the Canadian dental researchers have detected tiny cavities by using Raman spectroscopy to search for slight decreases in calcium hydroxyapatite, the dominant mineral component of teeth. The team presented its latest work at a meeting in June sponsored by the European Organisation for Caries Research and then discussed it again in July at a conference of the International Association for Dental Research.
Cavities, which often result from dental caries, are spots on the tooth where minerals have leached out. Bacteria in plaque play a key role in cavity formation by producing acids that leach the minerals. With less minerals in the tooth structure, the tooth begins to dissolve and can rot.
Dentists usually use X-rays and dental probes — the metal picks that can scratch at the teeth — to detect cavities. But with these tools, dentists can detect only major damage to the tooth and cavities as big as a millimeter in size. And by this stage, Choo-Smith says, the tooth can be in pretty bad shape.
“Using Raman, however, would let dentists detect small changes in mineral levels of the tooth long before a cavity actually became a cavity,” Batchelder says. Dentists could detect precursors to cavities and weak spots with lesions only 100–250 micrometers deep, about the size of an individual grain of sand. The Raman tool might also detect troublesome spots between teeth.
Catching the problem areas at an early stage could eliminate the dentist’s need to drill, Choo-Smith says. Instead patients could self-treat the tiny, trouble areas with fluoride or antimicrobials.
Using spectroscopy coupled with an imaging technique called optical coherence tomography to detect a speck of a cavity might seem like overkill to some patients, says Cecilia Dong, a dentist at the University of Manitoba in Canada and one of Choo-Smith’s collaborators. But the more information dentists have, the more accurate their diagnoses will be. That could mean less pain for patients, she adds.
What’s more, Raman spectroscopy does not use ionizing radiation like X-rays do, so pregnant women and small children could be safely scanned, Dong notes. With no radiation exposure to worry about, dentists could use Raman testing every time a patient comes into the office. Frequent scanning, she says, will truly show dentists and hygienists who is doing their daily brushing and flossing.
But adapting Raman spectroscopy for the dentist’s office, Choo-Smith explains, would require that dentists have a portable Raman-based unit and a miniature wand or probe to use in the mouth. Engineering and manufacturing probes for reading scattering spectroscopy emissions, specifically ones small enough to scan a tooth, is one of the greatest challenges for current Raman spectroscopy researchers.
And, while ever-smaller fiber optic cables and, in medicine, nanoparticles may help scientists add Raman spectroscopy to their disease-detecting arsenal, the development work is far from over. Still, each round of probe design and research yields clearer results. Within the next year and a half, Choo-Smith expects to take prototype probes into dentists’ clinics for testing. “I think it will still be another three to five years before they will have a product to wheel into their examining rooms,” she says.
Lifting latent prints
From inside the body to inside the mouth, Raman spectroscopy shows promise for detecting the molecular fingerprints of disease. But it also could prove useful for identifying real fingerprints — such as the prints a killer leaves on a victim’s body.
“Prints are really hard to lift from corpses,” says Linda Lewis, a chemist at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. “Our goal, though, is to detect fingerprints on surfaces where they are not traditionally detected.”
Lewis is developing a device based on Raman spectroscopy that would enable detectives to trace the chemical signatures of certain residues left by human hands — on corpses or even hard-to-analyze evidence. Working with researchers at ChemImage in Pittsburgh, Pa., and the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D.C., Lewis is using silver-coated nanowires, similar to Zavaleta’s gold nanoparticles, to mark a killer’s prints, or at least, right now, human prints left on dead animal skin.
The nanowires target specific fingerprint components — such as eccrine, a watery substance that comes out of the pads of human fingers and is not well detected using current forensic methods — that give off Raman scattering emissions. “The most active signal we get right now is actually from urea,” she says.
In theory, Lewis says, detectives would spray the silver-coated nanowires onto a corpse in the field and then use a Raman microscope-laser device to scan the body. The nanowires would detect particular molecules in urea, eccrine and possibly other substances. Passing the laser over the body would trigger the silver coating on the nanowires to amplify the signals emanating from the laser’s scattered photons by changing the electric field. Using the microscope, which would register the chemical spectrum and locate the signals, the investigators could isolate a killer’s fingerprint.
Lewis says analyzing the Raman spectroscopy scans is similar to looking at the individual pixels from a picture. Not every pixel has high peaks of light on it. Similarly, not everything gives off a Raman scattering signal. When the pixels are put together, though, the image appears in a matrix of light and dark spots. On the skin, the scattering signals from the 1-by-1-inch laser-light blocks can come together to show a fingerprint, like the pixels show the image, she says. And, once the Raman tool reveals the location of the left-behind molecules, detectives could collect the print for further analysis, just as they do now from hard surfaces.
Lewis and her colleagues are currently writing up their early results on the spectroscopy device for submission to the Journal of Forensic Sciences. Her team next needs to look for prints on actual decaying bodies instead of preserved pig and human skin, she says. Scanning for prints will help her team design a Raman spectroscopy device that could detect killer’s prints left on bodies found 24 to 48 hours after death.
“We need to see if the prints decompose as the body does or if heat or other factors affect the signals we can get from the prints,” she says.
And, although the Raman spectroscopy print identification tool is still in its testing phase, Lewis says the team wants to have something ready to go in about two years.
But corpses are not the only crime scene evidence detectives could scan for the signatures of fingerprints. Investigators could also do Raman-based analyses on explosive residues from terrorist attacks or even on heavily contaminated drug evidence. “Prints are hard to lift from these places too, and we want the device to work on all tough surfaces,” Lewis says. “My far out vision, probably in 10 years, though, is to scan live skin. That would identify abuse criminals.”
But creating a forensics Raman tool for widespread use means engineering nanowires more efficiently and at a lower cost. Researchers at the Naval Research Laboratory can make small quantities of nanowires, with a lot of effort, Lewis says. “The challenge is making large batches of the silver nanowires” more quickly, she says.
Medical applications for Raman spectroscopy, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Batchelder notes, face similar delays. Don’t expect to see Raman tools in a dentist’s or doctor’s office tomorrow, he says, adding that while he has seen technology improve immensely in the past 10 years, each biomedical application for Raman-based tools has had its holdups.
For medical researchers, probe design is a struggle. No commercial companies are currently invested in developing the probes, even though there is a major market for them, dental researcher Choo-Smith says. Researchers are basically going it alone, trying to build something that will bring the sensitivity of Raman spectroscopy to the examining and operating rooms. Still, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire scientists and doctors are optimistic, and while they recognize the obstacles, most are confident that soon they will be able to add an “R” for Raman spectroscopy to the alphabetical arsenal they use to explore the human body and catch criminals.
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
loring 6.lor.00.1 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Stem cells’ unassuming, bloblike appearance makes them hard to identify, but new research offers a way to blow their cover.
The technique can distinguish embryonic stem cells — which are pluripotent, meaning they can become any kind of cell in the body — from “adult” stem cells that reside in people’s organs and have a much more limited repertoire.
Using the new test, Jeanne Loring of the Scripps Research Institute in La Jolla, Calif., and her colleagues also provide fresh evidence that stem cells made by “reprogramming” a person’s skin cells without ever making or destroying an embryo are truly pluripotent, just like embryonic stem cells.
The findings, reported online August 24 in Nature, suggest that these reprogrammed, embryonic-like stem cells could be used for future stem cell therapies in place of embryonic cells, which are more controversial because they are extracted from embryos.
Scientists have debated whether reprogrammed cells truly have all the abilities of cells taken from embryos.
“You can do a pretty simple test now and discover if it’s pluripotent, and you couldn’t do that before,” Loring says.
To distinguish adult stem cells from pluripotent cells, Loring’s team compared the gene activity of about 150 stem cell samples of various types, including reprogrammed cells, embryonic stem cells and neural stem cells. Out of this comparison popped 299 interacting genes that form what the researchers call a pluripotency network, or PluriNet. Measuring the activity of these genes could reliably distinguish the different kinds of stem cells, the team reports.
“This is an exhaustive documentation of the essential gene expression features of pluripotency and will be a helpful roadmap for scientists working in this hot new area of biomedical research,” says George Daley of the Harvard Stem Cell Institute.
The way scientists have been testing the pluripotency of reprogrammed mouse cells is to add reprogrammed cells to mouse embryos and see whether the cells give rise to every type of body cell in the newborn pups. Such tests are difficult to perform with human cells for ethical reasons.
“People are always arguing about the differentiation potential and therapeutic potential of each of the various stem cells,” says Robb MacLellan, a cardiologist at the UCLA David Geffen School of Medicine. The new test is “going to help and speed up the development of this whole field.”
In 2006, Japanese researchers discovered a set of four genes that when injected into skin cells reprogram those cells into an embryonic-like state. Many of the 299 PluriNet genes encode proteins that are activated by this process, Loring says.
The test also found distinctions among neural stem cells that scientists had thought were the same, MacLellan notes. “There was a lot of divergence in terms of what other people were calling neural stem cells,” he says. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Identifying these previously unrecognized subtypes could help scientists better understand the various roles that the cells play in creating new nerve cells for the brain. “This test will help to clarify some of that.” http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO
The technique can distinguish embryonic stem cells — which are pluripotent, meaning they can become any kind of cell in the body — from “adult” stem cells that reside in people’s organs and have a much more limited repertoire.
Using the new test, Jeanne Loring of the Scripps Research Institute in La Jolla, Calif., and her colleagues also provide fresh evidence that stem cells made by “reprogramming” a person’s skin cells without ever making or destroying an embryo are truly pluripotent, just like embryonic stem cells.
The findings, reported online August 24 in Nature, suggest that these reprogrammed, embryonic-like stem cells could be used for future stem cell therapies in place of embryonic cells, which are more controversial because they are extracted from embryos.
Scientists have debated whether reprogrammed cells truly have all the abilities of cells taken from embryos.
“You can do a pretty simple test now and discover if it’s pluripotent, and you couldn’t do that before,” Loring says.
To distinguish adult stem cells from pluripotent cells, Loring’s team compared the gene activity of about 150 stem cell samples of various types, including reprogrammed cells, embryonic stem cells and neural stem cells. Out of this comparison popped 299 interacting genes that form what the researchers call a pluripotency network, or PluriNet. Measuring the activity of these genes could reliably distinguish the different kinds of stem cells, the team reports.
“This is an exhaustive documentation of the essential gene expression features of pluripotency and will be a helpful roadmap for scientists working in this hot new area of biomedical research,” says George Daley of the Harvard Stem Cell Institute.
The way scientists have been testing the pluripotency of reprogrammed mouse cells is to add reprogrammed cells to mouse embryos and see whether the cells give rise to every type of body cell in the newborn pups. Such tests are difficult to perform with human cells for ethical reasons.
“People are always arguing about the differentiation potential and therapeutic potential of each of the various stem cells,” says Robb MacLellan, a cardiologist at the UCLA David Geffen School of Medicine. The new test is “going to help and speed up the development of this whole field.”
In 2006, Japanese researchers discovered a set of four genes that when injected into skin cells reprogram those cells into an embryonic-like state. Many of the 299 PluriNet genes encode proteins that are activated by this process, Loring says.
The test also found distinctions among neural stem cells that scientists had thought were the same, MacLellan notes. “There was a lot of divergence in terms of what other people were calling neural stem cells,” he says. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Identifying these previously unrecognized subtypes could help scientists better understand the various roles that the cells play in creating new nerve cells for the brain. “This test will help to clarify some of that.” http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO
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